the attack.  General Wheeler in speaking of the same event says:  “General Young and myself examined the position of the enemy.  The lines were deployed and I directed him to open fire with the Hotchkiss gun.  The enemy replied and the firing immediately became general.”  There can be no question as to the planning of this fight nor as to the direction of the American force in the fight so far as any general direction was possible.  Colonel Wood directed one column and General Young another, while the plan of the attack undoubtedly originated with General Young.  General Wheeler conveys as much when he says:  “General Young deserves special commendation for his cool deliberate and skillful management.”  General Young, if only the commander of the right column consisting of two squadrons of regular cavalry, had not as large a command, nor as difficult and important a one as had Colonel Wood, and hence is not deserving of special commendation except upon the general ground that he had supervision over the whole battle.  This position is taken by General Shafter in his report, who though admitting the presence of the Division Commander, credits the battle to General Young, the commander of the brigade.  The reconnoissance in force for which Young had obtained authority from General Wheeler on the night of the 23rd had developed into a battle, and the plan had evolved itself from the facts discovered.  This plan General Wheeler approved, but in no such way as to take the credit from its originator; and it is doubtless with reference both to the plan and the execution that he bestows on General Young the mead of praise.  This statement of fact does not in the least detract from either the importance or the praiseworthiness of the part played by Colonel Wood.  Both he and the officers and men commanded by him received both from General Young and from the division commander the most generous praise.  The advance of Wood’s column was made with great difficulty owing to the nature of the ground, and according to General Young’s belief, he was in the rear when at 7.20 in the morning Captain Mills discovered the enemy, and a Cuban guide was dispatched to warn Wood, and a delay made to allow time for him to come up.  Colonel Wood, on the other hand, claims to have discovered the enemy at 7.10 and to have begun action almost immediately, so that it turned out as Young had planned, and “the attack of both wings was simultaneous.”  The Spaniards were posted on a range of high hills in the form of a “V,” the opening being toward Siboney, from which direction the attack came.

From Colonel Wood’s report it appears that soon after the firing began he found it necessary to deploy five troops to the right, and left, leaving three troops in reserve.  The enemy’s lines being still beyond his, both on the right and on the left, he hastily deployed two more troops, which made the lines now about equal in length.  The firing was now “exceedingly heavy,” and much of it