The voyage over, and the men having been crowded together on shipboard for nearly two weeks, it was now expedient to get them on shore as soon as possible.  But it was necessary to find out beforehand what defences were along the coast, and what forces of the enemy were likely to be encountered in landing.  The fleet lay off from the shore about a mile, and it was no small undertaking to convey the 17,000 men on board with all their arms and equipments to the shore in small boats over a rough sea, especially should the landing be disputed.  It was to arrange for the landing and also to map out a general plan of campaign that the three great leaders, Shafter, Sampson and Garcia met at Aserradores on the afternoon of June 20th as the American fleet stood guard over the harbor of Santiago.

General Garcia was already aware of the coming of the fleet, having received a message from Major-General Miles two weeks previous.  The letter of General Miles ran as follows: 

     Headquarters of the Army,
     In the Field, Tampa, Fla., June 2, 1898.

Dear General:—­I am very glad to have received your officers, General Enrique Collazo and Lieut.-Col.  Carlos Hernandez, the latter of whom returns to-night with our best wishes for your success.

It would be a very great assistance if you could have as large a force as possible in the vicinity of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, and communicate any information by signals which Colonel Hernandez will explain to you either to our navy or to our army on its arrival, which we hope will be before many days.

It would also assist us very much if you could drive in and harass any Spanish troops near or in Santiago de Cuba, threatening or attacking them at all points, and preventing, by every means, any possible re-enforcement coming to that garrison.  While this is being done, and before the arrival of our army, if you can seize and hold any commanding position to the east or west of Santiago de Cuba, or both, that would be advantageous for the use of our artillery, it will be exceedingly gratifying to us.”

To this General Garcia replied that he would “take measures at once to carry out your (Miles’) recommendation, but concentration of forces will require some time.  Roads bad and Cubans scattered.  Will march without delay.”  Admiral Sampson also cabled the Secretary of the Navy that Garcia “regards his (Miles’) wishes and suggestions as orders, and immediately will take measures to concentrate forces at the points indicated, but he is unable to do so as early as desired on account of his expedition at Banes Port, Cuba, but will march without delay.  All of his subordinates are ordered to assist to disembark the United States troops and to place themselves under orders.”  It was in compliance with these requests that General Garcia had the five thousand troops so near Santiago at the time he welcomed Shafter and Sampson to his camp, as mentioned above, and there is every necessary evidence that these Cuban troops took part in the fight about Santiago.  Says General Miles of Garcia:  “He had troops in the rear as well as on both sides of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival of our troops.”