FOOTNOTES: 

[10] The substance of this paper was contained in a discourse which was delivered in Edinburgh on the evening of Sunday, the 8th of November, 1868—­being the first of a series of Sunday evening addresses upon non-theological topics, instituted by the Rev. J. Cranbrook.  Some phrases, which could possess only a transitory and local interest, have been omitted; instead of the newspaper report of the Archbishop of York’s address, his Grace’s subsequently-published pamphlet “On the Limits of Philosophical Inquiry” is quoted; and I have, here and there, endeavoured to express my meaning more fully and clearly than I seem to have done in speaking—­if I may judge by sundry criticisms upon what I am supposed to have said, which have appeared.  But in substance, and, so far as my recollection serves, in form, what is here written corresponds with what was there said.

[11] “The Limits of Philosophical Inquiry,” pp. 4 and 5.

[12] Hume’s Essay “Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy,” in the “Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding.”

VIII.

THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF POSITIVISM.

It is now some sixteen or seventeen years since I became acquainted with the “Philosophic Positive,” the “Discours sur l’Ensemble du Positivisme,” and the “Politique Positive” of Auguste Comte.  I was led to study these works partly by the allusions to them in Mr. Mill’s “Logic,” partly by the recommendation of a distinguished theologian, and partly by the urgency of a valued friend, the late Professor Henfrey, who looked upon M. Comte’s bulky volumes as a mine of wisdom, and lent them to me that I might dig and be rich.  After due perusal, I found myself in a position to echo my friend’s words, though I may have laid more stress on the “mine” than on the “wisdom.”  For I found the veins of ore few and far between, and the rock so apt to run to mud, that one incurred the risk of being intellectually smothered in the working.  Still, as I was glad to acknowledge, I did come to a nugget here and there; though not, so far as my experience went, in the discussions on the philosophy of the physical sciences, but in the chapters on speculative and practical sociology.  In these there was indeed much to arouse the liveliest interest in one whose boat had broken away from the old moorings, and who had been content “to lay out an anchor by the stern” until daylight should break and the fog clear.  Nothing could be more interesting to a student of biology than to see the study of the biological sciences laid down, as an essential part of the prolegomena of a new view of social phenomena.  Nothing could be more satisfactory to a worshipper of the severe truthfulness of science than the attempt to dispense with all beliefs, save such as could brave the light, and seek, rather than fear, criticism; while, to a lover of courage and outspokenness, nothing could be more touching than the placid announcement on the title-page of the “Discours sur l’Ensemble du Positivisme,” that its author proposed