On the other two points Locke’s convictions were implicit rather than speculative:  he resisted the Cartesian theories without much developing his own, as after all was natural in a critic engaged in proving that our natural faculties were not intended for speculation.  All knowledge came from experience, and no man could know the savour of a pineapple without having tasted it.  Yet this savour, according to Locke, did not reside at first in the pineapple, to be conveyed on contact to the palate and to the mind; but it was generated in the process of gustation; or perhaps we should rather say that it was generated in the mind on occasion of that process.  At least, then, in respect to secondary qualities, and to all moral values, the terms of human knowledge were not drawn from the objects encountered in the world, but from an innate sensibility proper to the human body or mind.  Experience—­if this word meant the lifelong train of ideas which made a man’s moral being—­was not a source of knowledge but was knowledge (or illusion) itself, produced by organs endowed with a special native sensibility in contact with varying external stimuli.  This conclusion would then not have contradicted, but exactly expressed, the doctrine of innate categories.

As to the soul, which might exist without thinking, Locke still called it an immaterial substance:  not so immaterial, however, as not to be conveyed bodily with him in his coach from London to Oxford.  Although, like Hobbes, Locke believed in the power of the English language to clarify the human intellect, he here ignored the advice of Hobbes to turn that befuddling Latin phrase into plain English.  Substance meant body:  immaterial meant bodiless:  therefore immaterial substance meant bodiless body.  True, substance had not really meant body for Aristotle or the Schoolmen; but who now knew or cared what anything had meant for them?  Locke scornfully refused to consider what a substantial form may have signified; and in still maintaining that he had a soul, and calling it a spiritual substance, he was probably simply protesting that there was something living and watchful within his breast, the invisible moral agent in all his thoughts and actions.  It was he that had them and did them; and this self of his was far from being reducible to a merely logical impersonal subject, an “I think” presupposed in all thought:  for what would this “I think” have become when it was not thinking?  On the other hand it mattered very little what the substance of a thinking being might be:  God might even have endowed the body with the faculty of thinking, and of generating ideas on occasion of certain impacts.  Yet a man was a man for all that:  and Locke was satisfied that he knew, at least well enough for an honest Englishman, what he was.  He was what he felt himself to be:  and this inner man of his was not merely the living self, throbbing now in his heart; it was all his moral past, all that he remembered