No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands.  It would be difficult to find in history a more offensive document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which it gave either Servia or Europe.  Servia had forty-eight hours to answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed.  As the full text of the ultimatum first reached the Foreign Chancelleries nearly twenty-four hours after its service upon Servia, the other European nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.

[English “White Paper,” No. 5; Russian “Orange Paper,” No. 3.]

Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the fact that on the same day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the German Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian Governments that

     “the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian
     Government cannot but be looked upon as justified.”

[German “White Paper,” Annex 1B.]

How could Germany thus indorse the “demands” if it did not know the substance of the ultimatum?

The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M.  Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23d unless it had not only knowledge of Austria’s intention to serve the ultimatum but also at least of the substance thereof.

While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not responsible for Austria’s action—­a policy which would not lessen the discreditable character of the whole business—­yet the more reasonable assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria’s ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany’s warning to the powers were the result of a concerted action and had a common purpose.  No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this conclusion for a moment.

The communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to anticipates that Servia “will refuse to comply with these demands”—­why, if they were justified?—­and Germany suggests to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has “recourse to military measures,” that “the choice of means must be left to it.”