He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at Vienna—­note the significance of the exception—­not a single member of the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that the French Ambassador when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on July 23 was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually been issued, but was given the impression that its tone was moderate.  Even the Italian Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold’s confidence.

[Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1, 1914.]

No better proof of this sense of security need be adduced than that the French President and her Foreign Minister were thousands of miles from Paris, and the Russian Minister had, after the funeral of the Austrian Archduke, left Vienna for his annual holiday.

The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum.  If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express assurance that

“the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised any influence on its contents.  It is a mistake to attribute to Germany a threatening attitude.”

[Russian “Orange Paper,” No. 18.]

This statement is inherently improbable.  Austria was the weaker of the two allies and it was Germany’s sabre that it was rattling in the face of Europe.  Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war without first consulting Germany.

Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had “private information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor,” and that the German Ambassador himself “indorses every line of it.” [English “White Paper,” No. 95.] As he does not disclose the source of his “private information,” this testimony would not by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany’s official defense in the German “White Paper,” we find that the German Foreign Office admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum and not only approved of Austria’s course but literally gave her a carte blanche to proceed.

This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany’s attitude and pacific protestations that we quote in extenso.  After referring to the previous friction between Austria and Servia, the German “White Paper” says: