into the present war on account of the violation of Belgium’s neutrality was merely a pretext.  During the course of this controversy Gladstone’s attitude has in various ways been grossly misrepresented, Dr. von Mach of Harvard even stating in the columns of THE NEW YORK TIMES that Gladstone had declared the Treaty of 1839 “to be without force.”  But, apart from such patent distortions, Gladstone’s real position is apparently not clearly defined in the mind of the general public, which is merely seeking for the unadulterated truth, regardless of its effect upon the case of any one of the belligerents.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 the Prussian Ambassador in London informed Gladstone, then Prime Minister, that some time prior to the existing war France had asked Prussia to consent to the former country’s absorption of Belgium, and that there was in the possession of the Prussian Government the draft of a treaty to this effect in the handwriting of M. Benedetti, then French Ambassador at Berlin.  This communication was obviously made, as Lord Morley tells us, with the object of prompting Gladstone to be the agent in making the evil news public and thus of prejudicing France in the judgment of Europe.  Gladstone thought this “no part of his duty,” and very shortly thereafter, at the direct instance of Bismarck, this draft treaty of 1866-7 was communicated by Baron Krause of the Prussian Embassy in London to Delane, the editor of The Times.  On July 25, 1870, it was published in the columns of that paper and aroused considerable anxiety in England.

It immediately became imperative upon the British Government to take some action.  As Gladstone wrote to Bright, the publication of this treaty

has thrown upon us the necessity of doing something fresh to secure Belgium, or else of saying that under no circumstances would we take any step to secure her from absorption.  This publication has wholly altered the feeling of the House of Commons, and no Government could at this moment venture to give utterance to such an intention about Belgium.  But neither do we think it would be right, even if it were safe, to announce that we would in any case stand by with folded arms and see actions done which would amount to a total extinction of the public right in Europe.

The Special Identical Treaties.

A simple declaration of Great Britain’s intention to defend the neutrality of Belgium by arms in case it were infringed seemed to Gladstone not to meet the special requirements of the case as revealed by the proposed Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and France.  His main object was to prevent the actual execution of such an agreement, by means of which the two belligerent powers would settle their quarrels and satisfy their ambitions at the expense of helpless Belgium.  Hence, on July 30, the British Government opened negotiations with France and Prussia and within a fortnight had concluded separate but identical treaties with each of these powers.  According to these treaties, in case the neutrality of Belgium were violated by either France or Germany, Great Britain agreed to co-operate with the other in its defense.  The preamble of these treaties states that the contracting powers