I quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a war and the anterior and more fundamental causes; nevertheless, with the world in a state of Summer peace on July 23, 1914, an issue, gravely affecting the integrity of nations and the balance of power in Europe, is suddenly precipitated by the Austrian ultimatum, and thereafter and for the space of about a week a series of diplomatic communications passed between the Chancelleries of Europe, designed on their face to prevent a war and yet so ineffective that the war is precipitated and the fearful Rubicon crossed before the world knew, except imperfectly, the nature of the differences between the Governments involved.  The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the record that has been made up by the official communications which can, therefore, be treated as documentary evidence in a litigated case.

A substantial part of that record is already before the court of public opinion in the British and German “White Papers,” the Russian “Orange Paper,” and the Belgian “Gray Paper,” and the purpose of this article is to discuss what judgment an impartial and dispassionate court would render upon the issues thus raised and the evidence thus submitted.

Primarily such a court would be deeply impressed not only by what the record as thus made up discloses, but also by the significant omissions of documents known to be in existence.

The official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their possession, but the German “White Paper” on its face discloses the suppression of documents of vital importance, while Austria has as yet failed to submit any of the documentary evidence in its possession.

We know from the German “White Paper”—­even if we did not conclude as a matter of irresistible inference—­that many important communications passed in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is probable that some communications must also have passed between those two countries and Italy.  Italy, despite its embarrassing position, owes to the world the duty of a full disclosure.  What such disclosure would probably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion that her allies had commenced an aggressive war, which released her from any obligation under the Triple Alliance.

The fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture.  Germany admits and asserts as part of her defense that she faithfully exercised her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is such mediatory influence not disclosed by any practical results of such mediation, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna.

Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat the Servian reply “as a basis for further conversations,”