The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 465 pages of information about The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915.

The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 465 pages of information about The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915.

The famous exchange of telegrams between royalty began in the evening of July 29; and here it is wise to halt for a moment.  On July 30 the Czar telegraphed to the Emperor in reply to the Emperor’s expression of regret that Russia should be mobilizing, as follows:  “The military measures in force now were decreed five days ago.”  That is, according to the Czar, the Russian mobilization had begun on July 25.  On July 27, however, the Russian Minister of War, M. Suchomlinow, had declared to the German Military Attache “on his word of honor” that no mobilization order had been issued.  July 25, however, it will be remembered, was the day on which Sir G. Buchanan had reported from St. Petersburg that Russia will “face all risks of war” if she can feel sure of the support of France.

On July 31 Russia mobilized her entire army, which led to Germany’s ultimatum that Russia demobilize within twelve hours.  No reply was received to the request, and orders for the mobilization of the German Army were issued at 5:15 P.M., Aug. 1, after the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg had been instructed to declare that, owing to the continued mobilization of the Russian Army, a state of war existed between the two countries.

Kaiser Tried to Keep Peace.

In order to understand this step one should read the book “La France Victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain,” ("France Victorious in the Next War,”) by Col.  Arthur Boucher, published in 1911.  Col.  Boucher has stated the case baldly and so simply that every one can understand it.  In substance his argument is this:  “Alone France has no chance, but together with Russia she will win against Germany.  Suppose the three countries are beginning mobilization on the same day.  Germany finishes first, France second, and Russia last.  Germany must leave some of her troops on her eastern frontier, the rest she throws against France.  All France has to do is to hold them for a few days. [Col.  Boucher mentions the exact number of days.  This book is not at hand, and the writer prefers not to quote from memory.] Then Russia comes into play, more German troops will be needed in the East, the French proceed to an attack on their weakened enemy, and La France sera victorieuse.”

Everything hinges on just a couple of days or so.  A couple of days!  And how much of a start had Russia?  She had begun on July 25; on July 27 definite news of the Russian mobilization was reported in Berlin, although the Minister of War denied it “on his honor.”  On July 30 England was understood to have promised her support to Russia, and the Czar acknowledged that Russia had been mobilizing for the past five days.  Five days!  And Col.  Boucher, expressing the opinion of military experts, had counted on victory on a much smaller margin!

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The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.