The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 465 pages of information about The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915.

The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 465 pages of information about The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915.

From these reports it appears that the differences between Austria and Servia were on the way to a solution.  Austria claimed that her demands were just, and Servia did not deny this.  Austria further claimed that her prestige, her very existence, demanded the prompt compliance with her requests by Servia.  She explained in a satisfactory way the one point on which Servia had taken exceptions, and Servia was on the point of complying, and would have complied, if the powers had been willing to let her do so.  Such a conclusion of the incident would have strengthened Austria’s prestige and assured the punishment of the murderers of Serajevo.

Russia’s Remark About Austria.

The reason why Servia was not allowed to submit was Russia’s remark, quoted above, that she would not “allow” Austria to become the predominant power in the Balkans.  It was, therefore, Russia’s task to prevent Servia from accepting Austria’s note.  Since war was her alternative, baldly stated to England from the first, she had to do three things—­first, to secure as many allies as possible; secondly, to weaken her enemies, preferably by detaching from them Italy, and, thirdly, to get as much of a start in her mobilization as possible.

The treaties between Russia, France, and Great Britain, unlike those between Germany, Austria, and Italy, have never been published.  Whatever their wording may be, Russia was at first apparently not absolutely sure of the support of France, (No. 17,) and France, it would seem, was unwilling to tempt fate without the help of England.  That England should be willing to join such a combination for such a cause seemed so preposterous to Germany that she did not believe it.  Without England no France, without France no war, for alone Russia could not measure herself against Austria.  Austria would not have attacked her of her own free will, but if Russia had attacked Austria, the whole world knew from the published treaties that Germany was bound to come to the assistance of her ally.  It would have been two against one, and the two could have waited until Russia had finished her cumbersome mobilization.  For even if she had her whole army of many million men on the frontier, Austria and Germany together were strong enough to stem her advance.

Russia’s only chance, therefore, when Servia was on the point of yielding, and Austria had almost re-established her prestige, was to secure the help of France, but this meant also the promise of England.

The demands made on England by Russia, some of which are quoted in the “White Paper,” are too well known to deserve repetition.  This was the chief thing that counted, to get England’s promise.  The next was to detach Italy from her allies, (but of this there are no documents available,) and the third to gain time for her mobilization.  All the other suggestions and counter-suggestions which fill the English “White Paper” are insignificant, as soon as the fundamental positions of Austria and Russia are understood.

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The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.