Since we are dealing with the Italian dispatches here, it may be advisable to consider at once all the communications which are published as having passed between Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassador, Sir Rennell Rodd, in Rome.  They are numbered 19, (perhaps 28,) 29, 35, 36, 38, 49, 57, 63, 64, 80, 81, 86, 92, 100, and 106, of which the important numbers are 38, 57, 64, 80, and 86.

On July 23 Sir Edward Grey was informed that “the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.” (No. 38.)

Austria, in other words, believed that to let the murder of her heir-apparent pass unpunished would have meant a deathblow to her prestige, and consequently, as any one familiar with her conditions will agree, to her existence.  Russia, on the other hand, on July 25 said (see No. 17, report from Sir G. Buchanan) that she could not “allow (note the word) Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war.”

These two dispatches to Sir Edward Grey tell the whole story in a nutshell.  Austria believed, rightly or wrongly, that it was a question of life or death for her, while Russia claimed the right of preventing Austria from becoming the predominate power in the Balkans, and actually threatened war.  Russia did not claim to be concerned with the justice of Austria’s demands on Servia.

No such definite word of Russia’s intention was sent to Germany, for on July 26 Sir M. de Bunsen reported Germany’s confident belief that “Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia.” (No. 32.)

On the next day Sir Rennell Rodd reports from Rome (No. 57) that the Minister of Foreign Affairs believes that “if Servia will even now accept it (the Austrian note) Austria will be satisfied” and refrain from a punitive war.  He, moreover, believes—­and this is very important—­that Servia may be induced to accept the note in its entirety on the advice of the four powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.  Since Italy was to be one of the four powers, the Minister’s belief was doubtless based on accurate information.  There is then as late as July 27 no claim made by Servia that Austria’s demands are unreasonable.  She only hates to yield to Austria alone.  Austria, in the meanwhile, (No. 57,) repeats her assurance that she demands no territorial sacrifices from Servia.

On the next day, July 28, Sir Rennell Rodd reports (No. 64) that “Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note, if some explanation were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene.”  Austria, on her part, had explained that “the co-operation of the Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures.  Servia was said to have willfully misinterpreted this.” (No. 64.)