Great space is devoted in the article in question to Germany’s unwillingness to place the Austro-Servian controversy in the hands of France, England, Germany, and Italy.  As Germany disavows all interest in the controversy, if she speaks truly, it was not within her power to dictate to her ally in a matter which she could in nowise control except by force of arms.  Furthermore, had she had the power, how could she be expected to exert pressure on her ally to leave a vital controversy to a court of four, two of whom were bound by alliances with Russia, Austria’s real antagonist, and a third, (Italy,) as subsequent events have shown, Austria’s natural, geographical, and hereditary enemy?  At best, had each power held to its treaty obligations, there would have been a deadlock.

Further:  “The Russian Minister ... called at the German Foreign Office and asked it ’to urge upon Vienna ... to take up this line of conciliation.  Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.’” Elsewhere in the article a statement is made that the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian questions “for all practical purposes ... were indistinguishable.”  This inconsistency of having Servia in the light of a principal and then again in the light of an agent is the greatest stumbling block to a clear analysis of the precipitating cause of the war.  The logical explanation of Servia’s position is that of Russia’s agent.  Hence Germany could not be expected to exert the same pressure on an allied principal that Russia could exert on her agent.

It is true that Germany engaged in many blundering diplomatic quibbles in the final stages of preparation for the war; but it is also true that England quibbled, though with greater diplomatic finesse; for instance, “Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that ... if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace, and Russia and France rejected it, that ’his Majesty’s Government would have nothing to do with the consequences.’” Here it is apparent to every one that the word “reasonable” begs the questions.

Slav and Teuton.

The German people were encouraged to relish the idea of a war against Russia once that war became likely, for sooner or later it seemed inevitable that Slav and Teuton would clash, and Germany felt confident that at the present time she outmatched her enemy.  The Russians, too, were encouraged to desire the Slav provinces of Austria, which racially are a part of the Russian domain.  The English people were made to relish this opportunity to strike their great commercial competitor, especially when they could do so with little likelihood of unfavorable criticisms.  Finally, the impressionable French people were stirred to thoughts of revenge and recovery of their lost provinces.