“I thank you for your telegram.  I have shown yesterday to your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.  Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of your Government.  I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army.  An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery.  Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of your telegram.  I must ask most earnestly that you, without delay, order your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers.”

This impetuous step of Germany to compel its great neighbor to desist from military preparations to defend itself came most inopportunely, for on Aug. 1 the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador for the first time declared to the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and it was then suggested that the form of the ultimatum and the questions arising thereon should be discussed in London. (Dispatch from British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey at once advised the English Ambassador in Berlin of the fact, and urged that it was still possible to maintain peace

     “if only a little respite in time can be gained before any
     great power begins war,”

     [English “White Paper,” No. 131.]

but the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to Russia to demobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far for retreat, and, spurred on by the arrogant Potsdam military party, he “let slip the dogs of war.”  After the fatal Rubicon had been crossed and the die was cast the Czar telegraphed King George: 

“In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more I have done all in my power to avert war.”

Such will be the verdict of history.

The Judgment.

These are the facts as shown by the record, and upon them, in my judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following judgment: 

1—­That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a matter affecting the balance of power in Europe.  Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility.  They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to Servia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.

2—­That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted that influence.  On the contrary, she certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course.