“undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her
     demands on Servia, provided they did not embarrass Servian
     sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory.”

Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that if this was not satisfactory, and if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace and Russia and France rejected it, that

     “his Majesty’s Government would have nothing to do with the
     consequences,”

which obviously meant either neutrality or actual intervention in behalf of Germany and Austria.

On the same day the British Ambassador at Berlin besought the German Foreign Office to

     “put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in
     the general interest to reassure Russia and to show themselves
     disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis.”

And Sir Edward Goschen reports that the German Foreign Minister replied that last night he had

“begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.”

Again the text of the letter in which Germany “begged” Austria to be conciliatory is not found in the record.

The excuse of Germany that the mobilization of Russia compelled it to mobilize does not justify the war.  Mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but simply preparation.  If Russia had the right to mobilize because Austria mobilized, Germany equally had the right to mobilize when Russia mobilized, but it does not follow that either of the three nations could justify a war to compel the other parties to demobilize.  Mobilization is only a preparation against eventualities.  It is the right of the sovereign State and by no code of ethics a casus belli.  The demand of Germany that Russia could not arm to defend itself, when Austria was preparing for a possible attack on Russia, has few, if any, parallels in history for bullying effrontery.  It treated Russia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State.

It must be observed that, while Germany insisted that Russia should demobilize, the Kaiser offered no reciprocal promise.  On his theory Germany and Austria were to be left free to complete their preparations, but Russia was to tie her own hands and leave herself “naked to her enemies.”  This is shown by the last telegrams which passed between the Czar and Kaiser.  The Czar telegraphed: 

“I have received your telegram.  I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts.  With the aid of God it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood.  I expect with full confidence your urgent reply.”

To this the Kaiser replied: