The terms of the Franco-Russian alliance have never been made public.  Whether it was concluded merely for defensive or also for offensive purposes, and whether France was obliged by her treaty to draw the sword in the present case, remains therefore a matter of surmise.  But there is no mystery about the feelings of France with regard to Germany, and no doubt about the greed for revenge which during the last forty-four years has swayed the overwhelming majority of her people and been the dominant factor of her foreign policy.  It was for this object that she entered into her alliances and agreements, and it is for this cause that she is fighting now.

It is simple hypocrisy to talk about German aggressiveness against France.  France stood in no danger of being attacked by Germany if she had chosen to remain neutral in the latter’s war with Russia.  Asked whether she would do so, she replied that her actions would be guided by her interests.  The meaning of this reply was clear, and left Germany no choice.  The formal declaration of war became then a mere matter of political and military convenience, and has no bearing on the moral issue of the case.

But why has England plunged into this war?  Officially and to the world at large she has explained her resolution by Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality, and in the royal message to Parliament it was solemnly declared that England could not stand by and passively tolerate such a breach of international law and obligations.

No Austrian can read this declaration otherwise than with a mournful smile.  Its futility has been exposed by the question which Englishmen of standing and renown have put to their Government, viz., whether they would equally have declared war on France if that violation of neutrality had first come from her side.  In face of this question having remained unanswered, and in face of what has come to light since about French preparations in Belgium, there is no need to expiate on this subject.  All that there is to be said about it has been said by the German Chancellor in open session of the Reichstag, and all that may be added is the remark that, considering England’s history and what she did before Copenhagen in 1807, she of all nations should be the last to put on airs of moral indignation over the application of the principle that in time of war “salus reipublicae suprema lex est.”

The existence of a convention binding England to France in case of war has—­as far as I know—­never been admitted officially by England.  As I see now from manifestations of Englishmen disapproving of their country’s participation in the war, the belief exists nevertheless that such a convention had been concluded.  But whether England’s declaration of war was the consequence of previously entered obligations or the outcome of present free initiative, the main fact remains that in the last resort it sprang from jealousy of Germany’s growing sea power and commercial prosperity.  This feeling was the dominant factor in English foreign policy, just as greed for revenge was in France.  It was the propelling power for the agreements which England has made and for others which she endeavored but did not succeed in bringing about.