“who was very
willing to advise Servia to yield all that could
be fairly asked of her
as an independent power.”
The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
[English “White Paper,” No. 56.]
On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the French Foreign Office and strongly insisted on the “exclusion of all possibility of mediation or of conference,” and yet contemporaneously the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had
“started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna, immediately in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna.”
What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the official apologist for that country, after stating his conviction
“that an act of
mediation could not take into consideration
the Austro-Servian conflict,
which was purely an
Austro-Hungarian affair,”
claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey’s further suggestion to Vienna, in which Austria-Hungary was urged
“either to agree
to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or
to look upon it as a
basis for further conversations”;
but the Austro-Hungarian Government—playing the role of the wicked partner of the combination—“in full appreciation of our mediatory activity,” (so says the German “White Paper” with sardonic humor,) replied to this proposition that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, “it was too late.”
Does any reasonable man question for a moment that, if Germany had done something more than merely “transmit” these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish?
On the following day, July 28, the door was further closed on any possibility of compromise when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs
“said, quietly but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on the basis of the Servian note; that war would be declared today, and that the well-known pacific character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned.”
To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of Austria’s quarrel the British Ambassador suggested “the larger aspect of the question,” namely, the peace of Europe, and to this “larger aspect,” which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he