The claim of Germany to realize her Kultur at the expense of her neighbors is at first sight plausible.  Her Kultur is unquestionably higher than theirs.  She has a sharply realized idea of the State, and she has justified it largely in practice.  In a certain patience, thoroughness, and perfection of political organization her pre-eminence is unquestionable.  The tone of her apologists shows amazement and indignation over the fact that the world, so far from welcoming the extension of German Kultur, is actively hostile to that ambition.  Yet, even if it be conceded that Germany’s Kultur is wholly good for herself—­surely a debatable proposition—­it does not follow that it is or would be a universal benefit.  Nations may deliberately and legitimately prefer their culture, with its admitted disadvantages, to the Kultur which pleases Germany.  England is often mocked for the way in which she “muddles through” successive perils, yet she may feel that the stereotyping of her people in a rigid administrative frame might be too high a price to pay for constant preparedness.  As for us Americans, we have made a virtue, perhaps overdone it, of avoiding a mechanical Kultur.  We prefer the greatest freedom for the individual to the perfectly regimented state.  We will move toward culture and cheerfully assume the necessary risks of the process.

Unlovely and Impressive.

In a broader view, the war may be regarded as a contest between the metallic, half-mechanical Kultur of Prussianized Germany and the more flexible civilizations of States that have inherited culture or aspire to it.  Germany herself has rejected the humane and somewhat hazardous ideal of culture, so she cannot wonder or complain when she sees that the culture of the world is almost unanimously hostile to her.  There is no quarrel with German Kultur itself; merely a feeling that it has its drawbacks, that it is, on the whole, as unlovely as it is impressive, that there is quite enough of it in the world already, and that its broad extension would be disastrous.

Meanwhile the nations of culture have much to learn from Germany’s Kultur.  Flexibility may mean weakness.  The United States, for example, could well have a standing army and an army reserve commensurate with its history and prospects without incurring any danger of militarism.  There is, finally, some disadvantage in being merely a culture nation, for such a nation can add a large measure of Kultur without belying itself.  On the contrary, so highly developed a Kultur nation as the German Empire puts itself in a position where it is almost impossible to acquire any considerable degree of culture.  Culture is the enemy of such a state—­it must remain in the Spartan or Macedonian stage.  Rome began to decline as soon as Hellenistic culture got the ascendency over the old Latin Kultur.  Kultur, in short, galvanizes; culture liberates.  A survey of modern Germany hardly warrants a desire for her world dominion.