but added that Germany would, if an Austro-Russian dispute arose,

     “co-operate with the other great powers in mediation between
     Russia and Austria.”

[German “White Paper,” Annex 13.]

This distinction is very hard to grasp.  It attempts to measure the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee.  Russia’s difference with Austria was over the attempt of the latter to crush Servia.  Germany would not interfere in the latter, but would as an abstract proposition mediate between Russia and Austria.  For all practical purposes the two things were indistinguishable.

How she “co-operated” we shall presently see.

All that Germany did on July 25, so far as the record discloses, was to “pass on” England’s and Russia’s requests for more time, but subsequent events indicate that it was “passed on” without any indorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its ally’s request for more time if it had ever been made?

The Austrian Foreign Minister, having launched the ultimatum, absented himself from the capital, but the Russian Minister at Vienna, as already stated, succeeded in submitting this most reasonable request verbally to the Acting Foreign Minister, who simply said that he would submit it to Count Berchtold, but that he could predict with assurance a categorical refusal.  Later on that day (July 25) Russia was definitely advised that no time extension would be granted.

[Russian “Orange Paper,” Nos. 11 and 12.]

Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext?  A little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.  A colossal snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging diplomats.  A timely word from the German Chancellor would have saved the flower of the youth of Germany and Austria from perishing.  It would be difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a friendly power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.

Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France, and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily arresting military proceedings until efforts toward conciliation could be made.  Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy that they should unite in asking Austria and Servia not to cross the frontier “until we had had time to try and arrange matters between them,” but the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram that he had received from the German Foreign Office that “once she [Austria] had launched that note [the ultimatum] Austria could not draw back.”

[English “White Paper,” No. 25.]

As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession.  Its attitude was shown by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while disclaiming that Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany approved its point of view,