fires. Remark I.—­If the more numerous fleet has the wind it will be able more easily to turn its rear upon that of the enemy, and put him between two fires.  But if the more numerous fleet is to leeward it ought none the less to leave its rear astern, because the wind may shift in the fight.  Besides, the fleet that is to leeward can edge away insensibly in fighting to give its rearmost ships a chance of doubling on the enemy by hugging the wind. Remark II.—­I know that many skilful people are persuaded that you ought to double the enemy ahead; because, if the van of the enemy is once in disorder it falls on the rest of the fleet and throws it infallibly into confusion.’  And by the aid of diagrams he proceeds to show that this view is unsound, because the van can easily avoid the danger while the rear cannot.  To support his view he instances the entire success with which at the battle of La Hogue, Russell, having the superior fleet, doubled on Tourville’s rear.

‘To prevent being doubled,’ he proceeds, ’you must absolutely prevent the enemy from leaving ships astern of you, and to that end you may adopt several devices when you are much inferior in number.

’I.  If we have the wind we may leave some of the enemy’s leading ships alone, and cause our van to fall on their second division.  In this manner their first division will be practically useless, and if it forces sail to tack upon us it will lose much time, and will put itself in danger of being isolated by the calm which generally befalls in this sort of action by reason of the great noise of the guns.  We may also leave a great gap in the centre of our fleet, provided the necessary precautions be taken to prevent our van being cut off.  By these means, however inferior we be in numbers, we may prevent the enemy leaving ships astern of us. Example.—­Everyone did not disapprove the manner in which Admiral Herbert disposed his fleet when he engaged the French in the action of Bevesier [i.e. Beachy Head] in the year 1690.  He had some ships fewer than ours, and he had determined to make his chief effort against our rear.  That is why he ordered the Dutch leading division to fall on our second division.  Then he opened his fleet in the centre, leaving a great gap opposite our centre.  After which, having closed up the English to very short intervals, he opposed them to our rear, and held off somewhat with his own division so as to prevent the French profiting by the gap which he had left in his fleet to double the Dutch.  This order rendered our first division nearly useless, because it had to make a very long board to tack on the enemy’s van, and the wind having fallen, it was put to it to be in time to share the glory of the action.[3]

’II.  If the less numerous fleet is to leeward, the gap may be left more in the centre and less in the van, but it is necessary to have a small detachment of men-of-war and fireships so as to prevent the enemy profiting by the gaps in the fleet to divide it.