In the first place, after noting that these instructions begin logically with two articles for the formation of line ahead and abreast, we are struck by this disappearance of the Duke of York’s article relating to ‘dividing the enemy’s fleet.’  It is certainly to this disappearance that is mainly due the belief that the new instructions were retrograde.  The somewhat hasty conclusion is generally drawn that the manoeuvre of ‘breaking the line’ had been introduced during the Dutch Wars, and forgotten immediately afterwards.  But, as we have already seen, the Duke of York’s article can hardly be construed as embodying the principle of concentration by ‘breaking the line,’ and ‘containing.’  As we know, it only applied to an attack from the leeward which the English, and indeed every power up to that time, did all they knew to avoid, and it cannot safely be assumed to mean anything more than a device for gaining the wind of part of the enemy when you cannot weather his whole fleet; while the ‘containing’ was intended to prevent the enemy’s concentrating on the squadron that performed the manoeuvre.  Now, although Russell’s instructions lay down no rule for isolating and containing, they do provide three new and distinct articles by which the admiral can do so if he sees fit.  Under the Duke of York’s instructions, it will be remembered, it was left to the van commander to execute the manoeuvre of dividing the enemy’s fleet as he saw his opportunity, and under those of Lord Dartmouth it was left apparently to ‘any commander.’  With all that can be said for leaving the greatest possible amount of initiative to individual officers, such a system can hardly be called satisfactory, and in any case so important a movement ought certainly to be as far as possible under the control of the commander-in-chief.  But under the previous instructions he could not even initiate it by signal.  The defect had already been seen, and it will be remembered that the additions and observations to this and the following articles which the Admiralty Manuscript contains are all directed to remedying the omission.  It is to exactly the same end that Russell’s orders seem designed, and if, as we shall see to be most probable, they were really drawn up by Lord Torrington, we know that they were used in this way at Beachy Head.  Whether the idea of concentration and containing was in the mind of their author we cannot tell for certain, but at any rate the new instructions provide signals by which the admiral can order such movements not only by any squadron, but even by any subdivision he pleases.  The freedom of individual initiative it is true is gone, but this, as the Admiralty MS. indicates, was done deliberately, not as a piece of reactionary pedantry, but as the result of experience in battle.  In all other respects the tactical flexibility that was gained is obvious, and was fully displayed in the first engagements in which the instructions were used.