Secondly, for the sake of clearness the numbering of the articles is changed, every paragraph to which a separate signal is attached being made a separate instruction, so that with new instructions we have thirty-three articles instead of James’s twenty-four.  Thirdly, we have three new instructions proposed:  viz., No. 5, removing from flag officers the right to divide the enemy’s fleet at their discretion without signal from the admiral; No. 8, giving a signal for any squadron that has weathered part of the enemy by dividing or otherwise to bear down and come to close action; and No. 17, for such a squadron to bear down through the enemy’s line and rejoin the admiral.  All of these rules are obviously the outcome of known incidents in the late war.  There are also suggested additions or alterations to the old articles to the following effect:  (1) When commanders are in doubt or out of sight of the admiral, they are to press the headmost ships of the enemy all they can; (2) When the enemy ‘stays to fight’ they are to concentrate on his weathermost ships, instead of his headmost, as under the old rule; (3) Finally, while preserving the line, they are to remember that their first duty is ’to press the weathermost ships and relieve such as are in distress.’

It is this last addition to the Duke of York’s sixteenth article that contains the pith of the author’s ideas.  All his examples are chosen to show that the system of bearing down together from windward in a line parallel to that of the enemy is radically defective, even if all the advantages of position and superior force are with you, and for this reason—­that if you succeed in defeating part of the enemy’s line you cannot follow up your success with the victorious part of your own without sacrificing your advantage of position, and giving the enemy a chance of turning the tables on you.  Thus, if your rear defeats the enemy’s rear and follows it up, your own line will be broken, and as your rear in pressing its beaten opponents falls to leeward of the enemy’s centre and van it will expose itself to a fatal concentration.  His own view of the proper form of attack from windward is to bear down upon the van or weathermost ships of the enemy in line ahead on a course oblique to the enemy’s line.  In this way, he points out, you can concentrate on the ships attacked, and as they are beaten you can deal with the next in order.  For so long as you keep your own line intact and in good order, regardless of your rear being at first too distant to engage, you will always have fresh ships coming into action at the vital point, and will thus be able gradually to roll up the enemy’s line without ever disturbing your own order.  Fortifying himself with the reflection that ’there can be no greater justification than matter of fact,’ he proceeds to instance various battles in the late wars to show that this oblique form of attack always led to a real victory, whereas whenever the parallel form was adopted, though in some cases we had everything in our favour and had fairly beaten the Dutch, yet no decisive result was obtained.