comme seroit une armee de terre, et quand ils approchent ils s’etendent et tournent leurs bords pour combattre:  parce que le front a la mer se fait par le bord des vaisseaux’:  that is, of course, the English bore down on the Dutch all together in line abreast, and then hauled their wind into line ahead to engage.  Again, in describing the danger Tromp was in by having weathered the English fleet with his own squadron, while the rest of the Dutch were to leeward, he says:  ’J’ai deja dit que rien n’egale le bel ordre et la discipline des Anglais, que jamais ligne n’a ete tiree plus droite que celle que leurs vaisseaux forment, qu’on peut etre certain que lorsqu’on en approche il les faux [sic] tous essuier.’  The very precision of the English formation however, as he points out, was what saved Tromp from destruction, because having weathered their van-ship, he had the wind of them all and could not be enveloped.  On the other hand, he says, whenever an English ship penetrated the Dutch formation it fared badly because the Dutch kept themselves ’redoublez’—­that is, not in a single line.  As a general principle, then, he declares that it is safer to ’entrer dans une flotte d’Angleterre que de passer aupres’ (i.e. stand along it), ’et bien mieux de passer aupres d’une flotte Hollandaise que se meler au travers, si elle combat toujours comme elle fit pour lors.’  But on the whole he condemns the loose formation of the Dutch, and says it is really due not to a tactical idea, but to individual captains shirking their duty.  It is clear, then, that whatever was De Ruyter’s intention, the Dutch did not fight in a true line.  Later on in the same action he says:  ’Ruyter de son cote appliqua toute son industrie pour donner une meilleure forme a sa ligne ... enfin par ce moyen nous nous remismes sur une ligne parallele a celle des Anglais.’  Finally, in summing up the tactical lesson of the stupendous battle, he concludes:  ’A la verite l’ordre admirable de leur [the English] armee doit toujours etre imite, et pour moi je sais bien que si j’etais dans le service de mer, et que je commandasse des vaisseaux du Roi je songerois a battre les Anglois par leur propre maniere et non par celle des Hollandoises, et de nous autres, qui est de vouloir aborder.’  In defence of his view he cites a military analogy, instancing a line of cavalry, which being controlled ‘avec regle’ devotes itself solely to making the opposing force give way, and keeps as close an eye on itself as on the enemy.  Supposing such a line engaged against another body of horse in which the squadrons break their ranks and advance unevenly to the charge, such a condition, he says, would not promise success to the latter, and the parallel he contends is exact.[10]

From this account by an accomplished student of tactics we may deduce three indisputable conclusions, 1.  That the formation in line ahead was aimed at the development of gun power as opposed to boarding. 2.  That it was purely English, and that, however far Dutch tacticians had sought to imitate it, they had not yet succeeded in forcing it on their seamen. 3.  That the English certainly fought in line, and had reached a perfection in handling the formation which could only have been the result of constant practice in fleet tactics.