the fleet tactics.  The action off Portland on February 18, 1653, and the ensuing chase of Tromp, marked the first real success of the war; but though the generals succeeded in delivering a severe blow to the Dutch admiral and his convoy, it must have been clear to everyone that they narrowly escaped defeat through a want of cohesion between their squadrons.  On the 19th and 20th Tromp executed a masterly retreat, with his fleet in a crescent or obtuse-angle formation and his convoy in its arms, but nowhere is there any hint that either side fought in line ahead.[4] On the 25th the fleet had put into Stokes Bay to refit, and between this time and March 29 the new orders were produced.[5]

The first two articles it will be seen are practically the same as the ‘Supplementary Instructions’ on p. 99, but in the third, relating to ‘general action,’ instead of the ships engaging ’according to the order presented,’ as was enjoined in the previous set, ’they are to endeavour to keep in a line with the chief,’ as the order which will enable them ’to take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy.’  Article 6 directs that where a flagship is distressed captains are to endeavour to form line between it and the enemy.  Article 7 however goes still further, and enjoins that where the windward station has been gained the line ahead is to be formed ’upon severest punishment,’ and a special signal is given for the manoeuvre.  Article 9 provides a similar signal for flagships.

Compared with preceding orders, these new ones appear nothing less than revolutionary.  But it is by no means certain that they were so.  Here again it must be remarked that it is beyond all experience for such sweeping reforms to be so rigorously adopted, and particularly in the middle of a war, without their having been in the air for some time previously, and without their supporters having some evidence to cite of their having been tried and tried successfully, at least on a small scale.  The natural presumption therefore is that the new orders only crystallised into a definite system, and perhaps somewhat extended, a practice which had long been familiar though not universal in the service.  A consideration of the men who were responsible for the change points to the same conclusion.  Blake, the only one of the three generals who had had experience of naval actions, was ashore disabled by a severe wound, but still able to take part, at least formally, in the business of the fleet.  Deane, another soldier like Blake, though he had commanded fleets, had never before seen an action, but had done much to improve the organisation of the service, and at this time, as his letters show, was more active and ardent in the work than ever.  Monck before the late cruise had never been to sea at all, since as a boy he sailed in the disastrous Cadiz expedition of 1625; but he was the typical and leading scientific soldier of his time, with an unmatched power of organisation and an infallible eye for both