as they shall be able, are to have a eye and regard in the fight to all the weaker and worser ships of the party, and to relieve and succour them upon all occasions, and withal being near the admiral may both guard him and aptly receive his instructions.  And for a numerous fleet they propound that it should be ordered also (when there is sea-room sufficient) into one only front, but that the ablest and most warlike ships should be so stationed as that the agility of the smaller ships and the strength of the other may be communicated[2] to a mutual relief, and for the better serving in all occasions either of chase or charge; to which end they order that all the files of the front that are to the windwards should be made up of the strongest and best ships, that so they may the surer and speedier relieve all such of the weaker ships, being to leewards of them, as shall be endangered or anyway oppressed by any of the enemy.’  All this is a clear echo of De Chaves and the system which still obtained in all continental navies.  For a large fleet at least Boteler evidently disapproved all tactics based on the line abreast, and preferred a system of small groups attacking in line ahead, on Cecil’s proposed system.  Asked about the campaign of 1588, he has nothing to tell of any English formation.  Of the crescent order of the Armada he says—­and modern research has fully confirmed his statement—­that it was not a battle order at all, but only a defensive sailing formation ’to keep themselves together and in company until they might get up to be athwart Gravelines, which was the rendezvous for their meeting with the Prince of Parma; and in this regard this their order was commendable.’

How far these ideas really represented current naval opinion we cannot precisely tell, but we know that Boteler was an officer held in high enough esteem to receive the command of the landing flotilla at Cadiz, and to be described as ‘an able and experienced sea captain.’  But whatever tendency there may have been to tactical progress under Buckingham’s inspiring personality, it must have been smothered by the lamentable conduct of his war.  Later on in the reign, in the period of the ‘Ship-money’ fleets, when Charles was endeavouring to establish a real standing navy on modern lines, we find in the Earl of Lindsey’s orders of 1635, which Monson selected for publication in his Tracts, no sign of anything but tactical stagnation.  The early Tudor tradition seems to have completely re-established itself, and Monson, who represents that tradition better than anyone, though he approved the threefold subdivision of squadrons, thought all battle formations for sailing ships a mistake.  Writing not long after Boteler, he says:  ’Ships which must be carried by wind and sails, and the sea affording no firm or steadfast footing, cannot be commanded to take their ranks like soldiers in a battle by land.  The weather at sea is never certain, the winds variable, ships unequal in sailing; and when they strictly keep their order, commonly they fall foul one of another, and in such cases they are more careful to observe their directions than to offend the enemy, whereby they will be brought into disorder amongst themselves.’