At first sight it would seem that De Chaves in this argument takes no account of superiority of seamanship—­the factor which was destined to turn the scale against Spain upon the sea.  But the following passage with which he concludes shows that he regarded seamanship as the controlling factor in every case.  ‘And if,’ he argues, ’they say that the enemy will take the same thought and care as I, I answer that when both be equal in numbers and arms, then in such case he who shall be more dexterous and have more spirit and fortitude he will conquer, the which he will not do, although he have more and better arms and as much spirit as he will, if he be wanting in good order and counsel.  Just as happens in fencing, that the weaker man if he be more dexterous gives more and better hits than the other who does not understand the beats nor knows them, although he be the stronger.  And the same holds good with any army whatsoever on land, and it has been seen that the smaller by their good order have defeated the stronger.’

From the work in question Captain Fernandez Duro gives four sections or chapters in Appendix 12 to the first volume of his history,[2] namely, 1.  ‘Of war or battle at sea,’ relating to single ship actions. 2.  ‘The form of a battle and the method of fighting,’ relating to armament, fire discipline, boarding and the like. 3.  ’Of a battle of one fleet against another.’ 4.  ‘Battle.’  In the last two sections is contained the earliest known attempt to formulate a definite fighting formation and tactical system for sailing fleets, and it is from these that the following extracts have been translated.

It will be noted that in the root-idea of coming as quickly as possible to close quarters, and in relying mainly on end-on fire, the proposed system is still quite mediaeval and founded mainly upon galley tactics.  But a new and advanced note is struck in the author’s insistence on the captain-general’s keeping out of action as long as possible, instead of leading the attack in the time-honoured way.  We should also remark the differentiation of types, for all of which a duty was provided in action.  This was also a survival of galley warfare, and rapidly disappeared with the advance of the sailing man-of-war, never to be revived, unless perhaps it be returning in the immediate future, and we are to see torpedo craft of the latest devising taking the place and function of the barcas, with their axes and augers, and armoured cruisers those of the naos de succurro.

ESPEJO DE NAVEGANTES, circa 1530.

[+Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola i.  App. 12+.]

Chapter III.—­Of a Battle between One Fleet and Another.

[Extract.]

...  When the time for battle is at hand the captain-general should order the whole fleet to come together that he may set them in order, since a regular order is no less necessary in a fleet of ships for giving battle to another fleet than it is in an army of soldiers for giving battle to another army.