The next is a tactical memorandum or general order, issued by Lord Collingwood for the Mediterranean fleet in 1808, printed in Mr. Newnham Collingwood’s Correspondence of Lord Collingwood.  No order of battle is given; but two years later, in issuing an additional instruction, he refers to his general order as still in force.  In this case we have the battle order, and it consists of twenty of the line in two equal columns, with the commander-in-chief and his second in command, second in their respective divisions.  There were no other flag officers in the fleet.[3] The memorandum which is printed below will be seen to be an obvious imitation of Nelson’s, and nothing can impress us more deeply with the merit of Nelson’s work than to compare it with Collingwood’s.  Like Nelson, Collingwood begins with introductory remarks emphasising the importance of ’a prompt and immediate attack’ and independent divisional control; and in order to remedy certain errors of Trafalgar, he insists in addition on close order being kept throughout the night and the strictest attention being paid to divisional signals, thinking no doubt how slowly the rear ships at Trafalgar had struggled into action, and how his signal for line of bearing had been practically ignored.  Then, after stating broadly that he means with the van or weather division to attack the van of the enemy, while the lee or larboard division simultaneously attacks the rear, he differentiates like Nelson between a weather and a lee attack.  For the attack from to-windward he directs the two divisions to run down in line abreast in such a way that they will come into action together in a line parallel to the enemy; but, whatever he intended, nothing is said about concentrating on any part of the enemy, or about breaking the line in all parts or otherwise.

The attack from to-leeward is to be made perpendicularly in line ahead.  In this formation his own (the weather column) is to break the line, so as to cut off the van quarter of the enemy’s line from the other three quarters, and the lee column is to sever this part of the enemy’s line a few ships in rear of their centre.  So soon as the leading ships have passed through and so weathered the enemy, they are to keep away and lead down his line so as to engage the rear three fourths to windward.  This is of course practically identical with the lee attack of Nelson’s memorandum.  The only addition is the course that is to be taken after breaking the line.  One cannot help wondering how far the leading ships after passing the line would have been able to lead down it before they were disabled, but the addition is interesting as the first known direction as to what was to be done after breaking the line in line ahead after Rodney’s method.  Seeing the grave and obvious dangers of the movement it is natural that, like Nelson, Collingwood hoped not to be forced to make it; what he desired was a simple engagement on similar tacks.  His ‘intended attack’ as in Nelson’s case is clearly that from to-windward.