a sealed book to the majority of British officers.  But the trouble was certainly intensified by the fact—­as contemporary naval literature shows—­that by Nelson’s success and death the memorandum became consecrated into a kind of sacred document, which it was almost sacrilege to discuss.  The violent polemics of such men as James, the naval chronicler, made it appear profanity so much as to consider whether Nelson’s attack differed in the least from his intended plan, and anyone who ventured to examine the question in the light of general principles was likely to be shouted down as a presumptuous heretic.  Venial as was this attitude of adulation under all the circumstances, it had a most evil influence on the service.  The last word seemed to have been said on tactics; and oblivious of the fact that it is a subject on which the last word can never be spoken, and that the enemy was certain to learn from Nelson’s practice as well as ourselves, admirals were content to produce a colourable imitation of his memorandum, and everyone was satisfied not to look ahead any further.  To no one did it occur to consider how the new method of attack was to be applied if the enemy adopted Nelson’s formation.  They simply assumed an endless succession of Trafalgars.

The first outcome of this attitude of mind is an ’Order of Battle and Sailing,’ accompanied by certain instructions, issued by Admiral Gambier from the Prince of Wales in Yarmouth Roads, on July 23, 1807, when he was about to sail to seize the Danish fleet.[2] His force consisted of thirty of the line, and its organisation and stations of flag officers were as follows: 

VAN SQUADRON

  Division 1.  Commodore Hood (No. 1 in line). 
  Division 2.  Vice-Admiral Stanhope (No. 6).

CENTRE DIVISION

  Division 1.} Admiral Gambier (No. 15). 
  Division 2.}

REAR SQUADRON

  Division 1.  Rear-Admiral Essington (No. 25). 
  Division 2.  Commodore Keats (No. 30).

Gambier’s fleet was thus organised in three equal squadrons (the centre one called ‘the centre division’) and six equal subdivisions.  The commander-in-chief was in the centre and had no other flag in his division, Similarly each junior flag officer was in the centre of his squadron and led his subdivision, but he had a commodore to lead his other subdivision.  These two commodores also led the fleet on either tack.  So far all is plain, but when we endeavour to understand by the appended instruction what battle formation Gambier intended by his elaborate organisation it is very baffling.  Possibly we have not got the instruction exactly as Gambier wrote it; but as it stands it is confused past all understanding, and no conceivable battle formation can be constructed from it.  All we can say for certain is that he evidently believed he was adopting the principles of Trafalgar, and perhaps going beyond them.  The sailing order is to be also the battle order, but whether in two columns or three is not clear.  Independent control of divisions and squadrons is also there, and even the commodores are to control their own subdivisions ’subject to the general direction’ of their squadronal commanders, but whether the formation was intended to follow that of Nelson the instruction entirely fails to disclose.