The business of a commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy’s fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean that of laying his ships close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as possible, and secondly, to continue them there without separating until the business is decided), I am sensible beyond this object it is not necessary that I should say a word, being fully assured that the admirals and captains of the fleet I have the honour to command will, knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply any deficiency in my not making signals, which may, if extended beyond those objects, either be misunderstood, or if waited for very probably from various causes be impossible for the commander-in-chief to make.  Therefore it will only be requisite for me to state in as few words as possible the various modes in which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object; on which depends not only the honour and glory of our country, but possibly its safety, and with it that of all Europe, from French tyranny and oppression.

If the two fleets are both willing to fight, but little manoeuvring is necessary, the less the better.  A day is soon lost in that business.  Therefore I will only suppose that the enemy’s fleet being to leeward standing close upon a wind, and that I am nearly ahead of them standing on the larboard tack.  Of course I should, weather them.  The weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale of wind the manoeuvring of both fleets is but of little avail, and probably no decisive action would take place with the whole fleet.[2]

Two modes present themselves:  one to stand on just out of gun-shot, until the van ship of my line would be about the centre ship of the enemy; then make the signal to wear together; then bear up [and] engage with all our force the six or five van ships of the enemy, passing, certainly if opportunity offered, through their line.  This would prevent their bearing up, and the action, from the known bravery and conduct of the admirals and captains, would certainly be decisive.  The second or third rear ships of the enemy would act as they please, and our ships would give a good account of them, should they persist in mixing with our ships.

The other mode would be to stand under an easy but commanding sail directly for their headmost ship, so as to prevent the enemy from knowing whether I should pass to leeward or to windward of him.  In that situation I would make the signal to engage the enemy to leeward, and cut through their fleet about the sixth ship from the van, passing very close.  They being on a wind and you going large could cut their line when you please.  The van ships of the enemy would, by the time our rear came abreast of the van ship, be severely cut up, and our van could not expect to escape damage.  I would then have our rear ship and every ship in succession wear [and] continue the action with either the van