Codrington’s allusion to Nelson’s alleged feint on the enemy’s van brings us to the last point; the question, that is, as to whether, apart from the substitution of the perpendicular for the parallel attack, and in spite of the change of balance, the two lines were actually handled in the action according to the principles of the memorandum for the intended attack from to-windward.

Lady Bourchier’s note continues, after referring to Nelson’s intention to make a feint on the van, ’The Victory did accordingly haul to port:  and though she took in her larboard and weather studding sails, she kept her starboard studding sails set (notwithstanding they had become the lee ones and were shaking), thus proving that he proposed to resume his course, as those sails would be immediately wanted to get the Victory into her former station.’  The note in Nicolas is to the same effect, but adds that Codrington had no doubt that having taken in his weather studding sails he kept the lee ones ’set and shaking in order to make it clear to the fleet that his movement was merely a feint, and that the Victory would speedily resume her course and fulfil his intention of cutting through the centre.’  And in admiration of the movement Codrington called his first lieutenant and said, ’How beautifully the admiral is carrying his design into effect!’ Though all this was written long after, when his memory perhaps was fading, it is confirmed by a contemporary entry in his log:  ’The Victory, after making a feint as of attacking the enemy’s van, hauled to starboard so as to reach their centre.’[32] This is all clear enough so far, but now we have to face a signal mentioned in the log of the Euryalus which, as she was Nelson’s repeating frigate, cannot be ignored.  According to this high authority Nelson, about a quarter of an hour before making his immortal signal, telegraphed ’I intend to push or go through the end of the enemy’s line to prevent them from getting into Cadiz.’  It is doubtful how far this signal was taken in, but those who saw it must have thought that Nelson meant to execute Howe’s manoeuvre upon the enemy’s leading ships.  At this time, according to the master of the Victory, he was standing for the enemy’s van.  Nelson also signalled to certain ships to keep away a point to port.  The Victory’s log has this entry:  ’At 4 minutes past 12 opened our fire on the enemy’s van, in passing down their line.’  At 30 minutes past 12 the Victory got up with Villeneuve’s flagship and then broke through the line.  Now at first sight it might appear that Nelson really intended to attack the van and not the centre, on the principle of Hoste’s old manoeuvre which Howe had reintroduced into the Signal Book for attacking a numerically superior fleet—­that is, van to van and rear to rear, leaving the enemy’s centre unoccupied.[33] For the old signal provided that when this was done ’the flag officers are, if circumstances permit, to engage the flag officers of the enemy,’ which was exactly what Nelson