There can be little doubt, however, that Nelson on the morning of the battle did abandon the idea of the advanced squadron altogether.  Early on the 20th it was broken up again.  At 8 o’clock in the morning of that day the captains of the Mars, Colossus and Defence (which apparently was by this time ready again for service) were called on board the Victory and ordered out to form a chain as before between the admiral and his frigates.[29] The rest presumably resumed their stations in the fleet.  Even if he had not actually abandoned this part of his plan, it is clear that in his hurry to attack Nelson would not spend time in reforming the squadron as a separate unit, but chose rather to carry out his design, so far as was possible, with two divisions only.  So soon as he sighted the enemy’s fleet at daylight on the 21st, he made the signal to form the line of battle in two columns, and with one exception the whole of the advanced ships took station in their respective divisions according to the original order of battle and sailing.’[30] The exception was Codrington’s ship, the Orion.  No importance however need be attached to this, for although he was originally in Collingwood’s division he may well have been transferred to Nelson’s some time before.  It is only worthy of remark because Codrington, of all the advanced squadron captains, was the only one, so far as we know, who still considered the squadron a potential factor in the fleet and acted accordingly.  While Belleisle, Mars, Bellerophon and Colossus rushed into the fight in the van of Collingwood’s line, Orion in the rear of Nelson’s held her fire even when she got into action, and cruised about the melee, carefully seeking points where she could do most damage to an enemy, or best help an overmatched friend—­well-judged piece of service, on which he dwells in his correspondence over and over again with pardonable complacency.  He was thus able undoubtedly to do admirable service in the crisis of the action.

That the bulk of his colleagues thought all idea of a reserve squadron had been abandoned by Nelson is clear, and the resulting change was certainly great enough to explain why some of the captains thought the plan of the memorandum had been abandoned altogether.  For not only was the attack made in two divisions instead of one, and in line ahead instead of line abreast, but its prescribed balance was entirely upset.  Instead of Nelson having the larger portion of the fleet for containing the van and centre, Collingwood had the larger portion for the attack on the rear.  In other words, instead of the advanced squadron being under Nelson’s direction, the bulk of it was attached to Collingwood.  If some heads—­even as clear as Codrington’s—­were puzzled, it is little wonder.

As to the way in which this impulsive change of plan was brought about, Codrington says, ’They [the enemy] suddenly wore round so as to have Cadiz under their lee, with every appearance of a determination to go into that port.  Lord Nelson therefore took advantage of their confusion in wearing, and bore down to attack them with the fleet in two columns.’  This was in the note dictated to Lady Bourchier, and in a letter of October 28, 1805, to Lord Garlies he says, ’We all scrambled into battle as soon as we could.’[31]