of battle and sailing.’  Many years later in a note upon the battle which Codrington dictated to his daughter, Lady Bourchier, he says that on the 20th, in spite of Collingwood’s advice to attack at once, Nelson ’continued waiting upon them in two columns according to the order of sailing and the memorable written instruction which was given out to all the captains.’[23] Later still, when a veteran of seventy-six years, he gave to Sir Harris Nicolas another note which shows how in his own mind he reconciled the apparent discrepancy between the dual and the triple organisation.  It runs as follows:  ’In Lord Nelson’s memorandum of October 9, 1805, he refers to “an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships” to be added to either of the two lines of the order of sailing as may be required; and says that this advanced squadron would probably have to cut through “two, three or four ships of the enemy’s centre so as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture";[24] and he afterwards twice speaks of the enemy’s van coming to succour their rear.  Now I am under the impression that I was expressly instructed by Lord Nelson (referring to the probability of the enemy’s van coming down upon us), being in the Orion, one of the eight ships named, that he himself would probably make a feint of attacking their van in order to prevent or retard it.’  Here then would seem to be still further confusion, due to a failure to distinguish between the leeward and windward form of attack.  According to this statement Codrington believed the advanced squadron was in either case to attack the centre, while Nelson with his division contained the van.  But curiously enough in a similar note, printed by Lady Bourchier on Nicolas’s authority, there is a difference in the wording which, though difficult to account for, seems to give the truer version of what Codrington really said.  It is there stated that Codrington told Nicolas he was strongly impressed with the belief ’that Lord Nelson directed eight of the smaller and handier ships, of which the Orion was one, to be ready to haul out of the line in case the enemy’s van should appear to go down to the assistance of the ships engaged to meet and resist them:  that to prevent this manoeuvre on the part of the enemy Lord Nelson intimated his intention of making a feint of hauling out towards their van,’ &c.  There is little doubt that we have here the true distribution of duties which Nelson intended for the windward attack—­that is, the advanced squadron was to be the real containing force, but he intended to assist it by himself making a feint on the enemy’s van before delivering his true attack on the centre.[25]