the writer thoroughly appreciated and understood the tactical basis of Nelson’s plan, as laid down in the memorandum, and he frankly condemns his chief for having exposed his fleet unnecessarily by permitting himself to be hurried out of delivering his attack in line abreast as he intended.  It might well have been done, so far as he could see, without any more loss of time than actually occurred in getting the bulk of the fleet into action.  Loss of time was the only excuse for attacking in line ahead, and the only reason he could suppose for the change of plan.  If they had all gone down together in line abreast, he is sure the victory would have been more quickly decided and the brunt of the fight more equally borne.  Nothing, he thinks, could have been better than the plan of the memorandum if it had only been properly executed.  An attack in two great divisions with a squadron of observation—­so he summarises the ’Nelson touch’—­seemed to him to combine every precaution under all circumstances.  It allows of concentration and containing.  Each ship can use her full speed without fear of being isolated.  The fastest ships will break through the line first, and they are just those which from their speed in passing are liable to the least damage, while having passed through, they cause a diversion for the attack of their slower comrades.  Finally, if the enemy tries to make off and avoid action, the fleet is well collected for a general chase.  But as Nelson actually made the attack in his hurry to close, he threw away most of these advantages, and against an enemy of equal spirit each ship must have been crushed as she came into action.  Instead of doubling ourselves, he says, we were doubled and even trebled on.  Nelson in fact presented the enemy’s fleet with precisely the position which the memorandum aimed at securing for ourselves—­that is to say, he suffered a portion of his fleet, comprising the Victory, Temeraire, Royal Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus, and Bellerophon, to be cut off and doubled on.[22]

The last important witness is Captain Codrington, of the Orion.  No one seems to have kept his head so well in the action, and this fact, coupled with the high reputation he subsequently acquired, gives peculiar weight to his testimony.  It is on the question of the advanced or reserve squadron that he is specially interesting.  On October 19 at 8 P.M., just after they had been surprised and rejoiced by Nelson’s signal for a general chase, and were steering for the enemy, as he says, ‘under every stitch of sail we can set,’ he sat down to write to his wife.  In the course of the letter he tells her, ’Defence and Agamemnon are upon the look out nearest to Cadiz; ...  Colossus and Mars are stationed next.  The above four and as many more of us are now to form an advanced squadron; and I trust by the morning we shall all be united and in sight of the enemy.’  Clearly then Nelson must have issued some modification of the dual ‘order