were formed two months before, ... and the advantage now was that they were familiar to the understanding of every captain in the fleet.’  Nelson probably felt that the dangers attending doubling in an action under sail are scarcely appreciable in an action at anchor with captains whose steadiness he could trust.  Still Saumarez, his second in command, regarded it as a mistake, and there was a good deal of complaint of our ships having suffered from each other’s fire.[7]

Amongst the more important retentions of tactical signals we find that for Hoste’s method of giving battle to a numerically superior force by leaving gaps in your own line between van, centre and rear.  The wording however is changed.  It is no longer enjoined as a means of avoiding being doubled.  As Howe inserted it in MS. the signification now ran ’for the van or particular divisions to engage the headmost of the enemy’s van, the rear the sternmost of the enemy’s rear, and the centre the centre of the enemy.  But with exception of the flag officers of the fleet who should engage those of the enemy respectively in preference.’[8] This signification again is considerably modified by the Explanatory Instructions.  Article XXIV., it will be seen, says nothing of engaging the centre or of leaving regular gaps.  The leading ship is to engage the enemy’s leading ship, and the rearmost the rearmost, while the rest are to select the largest ships they can get at, and leave the weaker ones alone till the stronger are disabled.  It was in effect the adoption of Hoste’s fifth rule for engaging a numerically superior fleet instead of his first, and it is a plan which he condemns except in the case of your being individually superior to your enemy, as indeed the English gunnery usually made them.

The curious signal No. 218 of 1782 for attacking the enemy’s rear in succession by ‘defiling’ on the Elizabethan plan was also retained.  In the Signal Book of 1799 it ran, ’to fire in succession upon the sternmost ships of the enemy, then tack or wear and take station in rear of the squadron or division specified (if a part of the fleet is so appointed) until otherwise directed.’

It has been already said that the alterations in the edition of 1799 were not of great importance, but one or two additions must be noticed.  The most noteworthy is a new signal for carrying out the important rule of Article IX. of the Instructions of 1782 (Article X. of 1799), providing for the formation of a corps de reserve when you are numerically superior to the enemy, as was done by Villeneuve on Gravina’s advice in 1805, although fortunately for Nelson it was not put in practice at Trafalgar.