The ‘line of bearing’ or ‘quarter line’ must have been one of these, and we therefore reach two important conclusions:  (1) that this great tactical advance was introduced by Anson during the War of the Austrian Succession, and (2) that the older set of Additional Fighting Instructions was then in existence.  Another improvement probably assignable to this time was Article IV. (of Boscawen’s set) for battle order in two separate lines.  Articles V., VI., VII., for extended cruising formations certainly were then issued, for in his despatch after his defeat of De la Jonquiere Anson says:  ’At daybreak I made the signal for the fleet to spread in a line abreast, each ship keeping at the distance of a mile from the other [Article V.] that there might not remain the least probability for the enemy to pass by us undiscovered.’[4]

Then we have the notable Article XVIII., not in the earlier sets, enjoining captains to pursue any ship they force out of the line, regardless of the contrary order contained in Article XXI. of the regular Fighting Instructions.  We have seen the point discussed already in the anonymous commentary on the Duke of York’s final instructions, and it remained a bone of contention till the end.  Men like Sir Charles H. Knowles were as strongly in favour of immediately following a beaten adversary as the anonymous commentator was in favour of maintaining the line.  Knowles’s idea was that it was folly to check the ardour of a ship’s company at the moment of victory, and he tells us he tried to persuade Howe to discard the old instruction when he was drawing up his new ones.[5]

As to the further tactical progress which the Boscawen instructions disclose, and which nearly all appear closely related to the events of the War of the Austrian Succession, when Anson was supreme, we may particularly note Article I., for equalising the lines and using superfluous ships to form a reserve; Article III. for closer action; Article VIII. for the reserve to endeavour to ‘Cross the T,’ instead of doubling; and Articles IX. and X. for bringing a flying enemy to action.

With these internal inferences to corroborate the direct evidence of our documents the conclusion is clear—­that during the War of the Austrian Succession the new system initiated by Vernon was developed by Anson as a consequence of Mathews’s miserable action off Toulon in 1744, and that its first fruits were gathered in the brilliant successes of Hawke and Anson himself in 1747.

Though no complete set later than those used by Boscawen is known to exist, we may be certain from various indications that they continued to be issued as affording a means of giving elasticity to tactics, and that they were constantly issued in changing form.  Thus Rodney, in his report after the action off Martinique in April 1780, says, ’I made the signal for every ship to bear down and steer for her opposite in the enemy’s line, agreeable to the twenty-first