[2] The undated admiralty copy (post 1744) has ‘flagstaves.’
[3] This manoeuvre was finely executed by Sir Clowdisley Shovell with the van squadron at the battle of Malaga.
[4] Burchett, the secretary of the navy, in his Naval History censures Benbow for not having acted on this instruction in 1702 or rather on No. 28 of 1691.
PART VIII
ADDITIONAL FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
I. ADMIRAL VERNON, circa 1740
II. LORD ANSON, circa 1747
III. SIR EDWARD HAWKE, 1756
IV. ADMIRAL BOSCAWEN, 1759
V. SIR GEORGE RODNEY, 1782
VI. LORD HOOD, 1783
ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS
INTRODUCTORY
Although, as we have seen, the ‘Fighting Instructions’ of 1691 continued in force with no material alteration till the end of the next century, it must not be assumed that no advance in tactics was made. From time to time important changes were introduced, but instead of a fresh set of ‘Fighting Instructions’ being drawn up according to the earlier practice, the new ideas were embodied in what were called ‘Additional Fighting Instructions.’ They did not supersede the old standing form, but were intended to be read with and be subsidiary to it. It is to these ‘Additional Instructions,’ therefore, that we have to look for the progress of tactics during the eighteenth century. By one of those strange chances, however, which are the despair of historians in almost every branch and period of their subject, these Additional Instructions have almost entirely disappeared. Although it is known in the usual way—that is, from chance references in despatches and at courts-martial—that many such sets of Additional Instructions were issued, only one complete set actually in force is known to exist. They are those signed by Admiral Boscawen on April 27, 1759, in Gibraltar Bay, and are printed below.
After his capture of Louisbourg in the previous year, Boscawen had been chosen for the command of the Mediterranean fleet, charged with the important duty of preventing the Toulon squadron getting round to Brest, and so effecting the concentration which the French had planned as the essential feature of their desperate plan of invasion. He sailed with the reinforcement he was taking out on April 14, and must therefore have issued these orders so soon as he reached his station. There is every reason to believe, however, that he was not their author; that they were, in fact, a common form which had been settled by Lord Anson at the admiralty. In the shape in which they have come down to us they are a set of eighteen printed articles, to which have