meant only a nominal change of overlordship, and was
further limited by a provision that certain “privileged
fiefs” were still to be retained under the direct
suzerainty of the French crown. As to the eventual
cessions, Alfonse and his wife were still alive and
likely to live many years. Even the cession of
Gascony was hampered by a stipulation that the towns
should take an “oath of security,” by
which they pledged themselves to aid France against
England in the event of the English king breaking
the provisions of the treaty. Perhaps the most
solid advantage Henry gained by the treaty was financial,
for he spent the sums granted to enable him to redeem
his crusading vow in preparing for war against his
own subjects. It was, however, an immense advantage
for England to be able during the critical years which
followed to be free from French hostility. If,
therefore, the French complaints against the treaty
were exaggerated, the English dissatisfaction was
unreasonable. The real difficulty for the future
lay in the fact that the possession of Gascony by the
king of a hostile nation was incompatible with the
proper development of the French monarchy. For
fifty years, however, a chronic state of war had not
given Gascony to the French; and Louis IX. was, perhaps,
politic as well as scrupulous in abandoning the way
of force and beginning a new method of gradual absorption,
that in the end gained the Gascon fief for France
more effectively than any conquest. The treaty
of Paris was not a final settlement. It left
a score of questions still open, and the problems
of its gradual execution involved the two courts in
constant disputes down to the beginning of the Hundred
Years’ War. For seventy years the whole
history of the relations between the two nations is
but a commentary on the treaty of Paris.
During his visit to Paris Henry arranged a marriage
between his daughter Beatrice and John of Brittany,
the son of the reigning duke. In no hurry to
get back to the tutelage of the fifteen, he prolonged
his stay on the continent till the end of April, 1260.
Yet, abroad as at home, he could not be said to act
as a free man. It was not the king so much as
Simon of Montfort who was the real author of the French
treaty. Indeed, it is from the conclusion of the
Peace of Paris that Simon’s preponderance becomes
evident. He was at all stages the chief negotiator
of the peace and, save when his personal interests
stood in the way, he controlled every step of the
proceedings. If in 1258 he was but one of several
leaders of the baronial party in England, he came
back from France in 1260 assured of supremacy.
During his absence abroad, events had taken place
in England which called for his presence.