225.  The greatest things in which there are degrees of both kinds, are the universe in its whole complex, the natural world in its complex, and the spiritual world in its complex; every empire and every kingdom in its complex; also, all civil, moral and spiritual concerns of these in their complex; the whole animal kingdom, the whole vegetable kingdom, and the whole mineral kingdom, each in its complex; all atmospheres of both worlds taken together, also their heats and lights.  Likewise things less general, as man in his complex; every animal in its complex, every tree and every shrub in its complex; as also every stone and every metal in its complex.  The forms of these are alike in this, that they consist of degrees of both kinds; the reason is that the Divine, by which they were created, is the same in things greatest and least (as was shown above, n.77-82).  The particulars and the veriest particulars of all these are like generals and the largest generals in this, that they are forms of both kinds of degrees.

226.  On account of things greatest and least being forms of both kinds of degrees, there is connection between them from first to last; for likeness conjoins them.  Still, there can be no least thing which is the same as any other; consequently all particulars are distinct from each other, likewise all veriest particulars.  In any form or in different forms there can be no least thing the same as any other, for the reason that in greatest forms there are like degrees, and the greatest are made up of leasts.  From there being such degrees in things greatest, and perpetual differences in accordance with these degrees, from top to bottom and from center to circumference, it follows that their lesser or least constituents, in which there are like degrees, can no one of them be the same as any other.

227.  It is likewise a matter of angelic wisdom that from this similitude between generals and particulars, that is, between things greatest and least in respect to these degrees, comes the perfection of the created universe; for thereby one thing regards another as its like, with which it can be conjoined for every use, and can present every end in effect.

228.  But these things may seem paradoxical, because they are not explained by application to visible things; yet things abstract, being universals, are often better comprehended than things applied, for these are of perpetual variety, and variety obscures.

229.  Some contend that there can be a substance so simple as not to be a form from lesser forms, and out of that substance, through a process of massing, substantiated or composite things arise, and finally substances called material.  But there can be no such absolutely simple substances.  For what is substance without form?  It is that of which nothing can be predicated; and out of mere being of which nothing can be predicated, no process of massing can make anything.  That there are things innumerable in the first created substance of all things, which are things most minute and simple, will be seen in what follows, where forms are treated of.