dissolution of the Second Duma, and the systematic oppression and repression of all radical organizations by the administration, had greatly reduced the Socialist parties in membership and influence.  The masses were, for a long time, weary of struggle, despondent, and passive.  The Socialist factions meanwhile were engaged in an apparently interminable controversy upon theoretical and tactical questions in which the masses of the working-people, when they began to stir at last, took no interest, and which they could hardly be supposed to understand.  The Socialist parties and groups were subject to a very great disability in that their leaders were practically all in exile.  Had a revolution broken out, as it would have done but for the war, Socialist leadership would have asserted itself.

As in all other countries, the divisions of opinion created by the war among the Socialists cut across all previous existing lines of separation and made it impossible to say that this or that faction adopted a particular view.  Just as in Germany, France, and England, some of the most revolutionary Socialists joined with the more moderate Socialists in upholding the war, while extremely moderate Socialists joined with Socialists of the opposite extreme in opposing it.  It is possible, however, to set forth the principal features of the division with tolerable accuracy: 

A majority of the Socialist-Revolutionary party executive issued an anti-war Manifesto.  There is no means of telling how far the views expressed represented the attitude of the peasant Socialists as a whole, owing to the disorganized state of the party and the difficulties of assembling the members.  The Manifesto read: 

There is no doubt that Austrian imperialism is responsible for the war with Serbia.  But is it not equally criminal on the part of Serbs to refuse autonomy to Macedonia and to oppress smaller and weaker nations?

It is the protection of this state that our government considers its “sacred duty.”  What hypocrisy!  Imagine the intervention of the Czar on behalf of poor Serbia, whilst he martyrizes Poland, Finland and the Jews, and behaves like a brigand toward Persia.

    Whatever may be the course of events, the Russian workers and
    peasants will continue their heroic fight to obtain for Russia a
    place among civilized nations.

This Manifesto was issued, as reported in the Socialist press, prior to the actual declaration of war.  It was a threat of revolution made with a view to preventing the war, if possible, and belongs to the same category as the similar threats of revolution made by the German Socialists before the war to the same end.  The mildness of manner which characterizes the Manifesto may be attributed to two causes—­weakness of the movement and a resulting lack of assurance, together with a lack of conviction arising from the fact that many of the leaders, while they hated the Czar and all his works, and could not reconcile themselves to the idea of making any kind of truce with their great enemy, nevertheless were pro-Ally and anxious for the defeat of German imperialism.  In other words, these leaders shared the national feeling against Germany, and, had they been free citizens of a democratically governed country, would have loyally supported the war.