efficiency, in Russia’s military organization.  As a highly developed industrial nation Russia would of necessity have been Germany’s formidable rival—­perhaps her most formidable rival—­and by her geographical situation would have possessed an enormous advantage in the exploitation of the vast markets in the far East.  As a feudal agricultural country, on the other hand, Russia would be a great market for German manufactured goods, and, at the same time, a most convenient supply-depot for raw materials and granary upon which Germany could rely for raw materials, wheat, rye, and other staple grains—­a supply-depot and granary, moreover, accessible by overland transportation not subject to naval attack.

For the Russian Jew the defeat of Germany was a vital necessity.  The victory of Germany and her allies could only serve to strengthen Prussian influence in Russia and add to the misery and suffering of the Jewish population.  That other factors entered into the determination of the attitude of the Jews, such as, for example, faith in England as the traditional friend of the Jew, and abhorrence at the cruel invasion of Belgium, is quite true.  But the great determinant was the well-understood fact that Germany’s rulers had long systematically manipulated Russian politics and the Russian bureaucracy to the serious injury of the Jewish race.  Germany’s militarist-imperialism was the soul and inspiration of the oppression which cursed every Jew in Russia.

II

The democratic elements in Russia were led to support the government by very similar reasoning.  The same economic and dynastic motives which had led Germany to promote racial animosities and struggles in Russia led her to take every other possible means to uphold autocracy and prevent the establishment of democracy.  This had been long recognized by all liberal Russians, no matter to what political school or party they might belong.  It was as much part of the common knowledge as the fact that St. Petersburg was the national capital.  It was part of the intellectual creed of practically every liberal Russian that there was a natural affinity between the great autocracies of Germany and Russia, and that a revolution in Russia which seriously endangered the existence of monarchical absolutism would be suppressed by Prussian guns and bayonets reinforcing those of loyal Russian troops.  It was generally believed by Russian Socialists that in 1905 the Kaiser had promised to send troops into Russia to crush the Revolution if called upon for that aid.  Many German Socialists, it may be added, shared that belief.  Autocracies have a natural tendency to combine forces against revolutionary movements.  It would have been no more strange for Wilhelm II to aid Nicholas II in quelling a revolution that menaced his throne than it was for Alexander I to aid in putting down revolution in Germany; or than it was for Nicholas I to crush the Hungarian Revolution in 1849, in the interest of Francis Joseph; or than it was for Bismarck to rush to the aid of Alexander II in putting down the Polish insurrection in 1863.