But, notwithstanding the unity upon these immediately vital points, the Moscow Conference showed that there was still a great gulf between the classes, and that no matter how they might co-operate to meet and overcome the peril that hung over the nation like the sword of Damocles, there could be no unity in working out the great economic and social program which must be the basis for the Social Democratic commonwealth which the workers sought to establish, and which the bourgeois elements feared almost as much as they feared the triumph of Germany.  In some respects the Conference intensified class feeling and added to, instead of lessening, the civil strife.  The Bolsheviki were not slow to exploit this fact.  They pointed to the Conference as evidence of a desire on the part of the Socialist Ministers, and of the officials of the Soviets, to compromise with the bourgeoisie.  This propaganda had its effect and Bolshevism grew in consequence, especially in Petrograd.

Then followed the disastrous military and political events which made it practically impossible for the Kerensky government to stand.  At the front the soldiers were still revolting, deserting, and retreating.  Kornilov was quite helpless.  Germany began a new offensive, and on September 2d German armies crossed the Dvina near Riga.  On September 3d Riga was surrendered to the Germans in the most shameful manner and panic reigned in Petrograd.  Then on the 9th came the revolt of Kornilov against the Provisional Government and the vulgar quarrel between him and Kerensky.  Kornilov charged that the Provisional Government, under pressure from the Bolsheviki, was playing into the hands of the German General Staff.  Kerensky, backed by the rest of the Cabinet, ordered Kornilov’s removal, while Kornilov despatched a division of troops, drawn from the front, against Petrograd.

It was a most disastrous conflict for which no adequate explanation can be found except in the strained mental condition of all the principal parties concerned.  In less strenuous times, and in a calmer atmosphere, the two leaders, equally patriotic, would have found no difficulty in removing misunderstandings.  As things were, a mischievous intermediary, and two men suffering the effects of a prolonged and intense nervous strain, provided all the elements of a disaster.  Kornilov’s revolt was crushed without great trouble and with very little bloodshed, Kornilov himself being arrested.  The Soviets stood by the Provisional Government, for they saw in the revolt the attempt to set up a personal dictatorship.  Even the Bolsheviki were temporarily sobered by the sudden appearance of the “man on horseback.”  Kerensky, by direction of his colleagues, became commander-in-chief of the Russian armies.  Always, it seemed, through every calamity, all parties except the Bolsheviki agreed that he was the one man strong enough to undertake the heaviest and hardest tasks.