destroy even the very realization of the Constituent Assembly.”  This profession of concern for the Constituent Assembly was hypocritical, dishonest, and insincere.  He did not in the least care about or believe in the Constituent Assembly, and had not done so at any time since the First Revolution of 1905-06.  His whole thought rejected such a democratic instrument.  However, he and his associates knew that the demand for a Constituent Assembly was almost universal, and that to resist that demand was impossible.  Their very obvious policy in the circumstances was to try and force the holding of the Assembly prematurely, without adequate preparation, and without affording an opportunity for a nation-wide electoral campaign.  A hastily gathered, badly organized Constituent Assembly would be a mob-gathering which could be easily stampeded or controlled by a determined minority.

Trotzky assailed the Coalition Government with vitriolic passion.  At the moment when it was obvious to everybody that unity of effort was the only possible condition for the survival of the Revolution, and that any division in the ranks of the revolutionists, no matter upon what it might be based, must imperil the whole movement, he and all his Bolshevik colleagues deliberately stirred up dissension.  Even if their opposition to political union with non-proletarian parties was right as the basis of a sound policy, to insist upon it at the moment of dire peril was either treachery or madness.  When a house is already on fire the only thing in order, the only thing that can have the sanction of wisdom and honor, is to work to extinguish the fire.  It is obviously not the time to debate whether the house was properly built or whether mistakes were made.  Russia was a house on fire; the Bolsheviki insisted upon endless debating.

Kamenev followed Trotzky’s lead in attacking the Coalition Government.  In a subtle speech he supported the idea of splitting Russia up into a large number of petty states, insisting that the formula, “self-determination of peoples,” applied to the separatist movement in the Ukraine.  He insisted that for the Russian working-people it was a matter of indifference whether the Central Empires or the Entente nations won in the war.  He argued that the only hope for the Russian Revolution must be the support of the revolutionary proletariat in the other European countries, particularly those adjacent to Russia:  “If the revolutionary proletariat of Europe fails to support the Russian Revolution the latter will be ruined.  As that support is the only guaranty of the safety of the Revolution, we cannot change our policy by discussing the question of how much fraternizing will stimulate the awakening of the proletariat of Europe.”  In other words, Kamenev was in the position of a desperate gambler who stakes his life and his all upon one throw of the dice or one spin of the wheel.