expenditure; which, however, can only be undertaken by the government when the fiat of financial insolvency which, with the Exchequer bill fraud, was the last legacy of Mr Spring Rice and Lord Monteagle, shall be superseded, and the Treasury rehabilitated, and then only by slow degrees, but sure.  An individual may, perchance, thrive upon an imposture, a government never; the late Ministry are the living evidence of the truth.  We can comprehend “self-supporting colonization” in the individual sense of the pioneers and backwoodsmen of the United States; in the “squatting” upon wild lands in Canada and the West Indies; in the settlement of isolated adventurers among the savages of New Zealand; but the “self-supporting” settlement of communities, or, as more fancifully expressed, of “society in frame,” is just as sound in principle, and as possible in practice, as would be the calculation of the Canadian shipwright, who should nail together a mass of boards and logs as a leviathan lumber ship for the transport of timber, on the calculation that at the end of the voyage it would be rated A1 at Lloyd’s, or grow into the solid power and capacity of a first-rate Indiaman, or man-of-war.  We all know that such timber floaters went to wreck in the first gale on our coasts; the crews, indeed, did not always perish, they were only tossed about at the mercy of the winds and waves with the wooden lumber which would not sink, so long as hunger and helplessness did not disable hands and limbs from holding fast.  And just so with the “self-supporting system of colonization.”

Having ascertained, upon bases laid down by Mr Cobden himself, but without adopting his slashing unproved totals, the extent to which colonial trade is criminally accessory to the financial burdens of the United Kingdom, (not, by the way, of the empire of which they form a component part,) it behoves us now to establish the proportion in which we are taxed for foreign trade, for there is clearly more than one vulture preying upon the vitals of this unhappy land.

We established, in our September number, an army cost of about L.1,200,000 against foreign trade for Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, Singapore, Penang, &c.  We may add, as a very low valuation, in the absence of accounts, L.250,000 more for the war with China.  Of the estimates for the navy, L.6,322,000, and ordnance, L.1,849,000—­total, L.8,175,000;—­we are fully entitled to charge about three-eighths to foreign commerce, or say L.3,000,000.  The numerous and extensive naval stations kept up for the protection of our foreign commerce exclusively, together with the Mediterranean, Levant, and Spanish coast naval expenditure, to no inconsiderable extent for the same object, will sufficiently justify this estimate.  We have apportioned one million of the naval and ordnance estimates for colonial purposes; one million more may be safely placed to the account of the slave trade; the remainder, L.3,175,000, is certainly an ample allowance for home naval stations, Channel fleet, if there be any, Mediterranean and other naval armaments, so far as for political objects only.  We remain, therefore, for foreign trade with—­