It was in this danger from a lee shore, which was deliberately though promptly incurred, that the distinction of this action of Rodney’s consists.  The enemy’s squadron, being only eleven ships of the line, was but half the force of the British, and it was taken by surprise; which, to be sure, is no excuse for a body of war-ships in war-time.  Caught unawares, the Spaniards took to flight too late.  It was Rodney’s merit, and no slight one under the conditions of weather and navigation, that they were not permitted to retrieve their mistake.  His action left nothing to be desired in resolution or readiness.  It is true that Rodney discussed the matter with his flag-captain, Walter Young, and that rumor attributed the merit of the decision to the latter; but this sort of detraction is of too common occurrence to affect opinion.  Sir Gilbert Blane, Physician to the Fleet, gives the following account:  “When it was close upon sunset, it became a question whether the chase should be continued.  After some discussion between the Admiral and Captain, at which I was present, the Admiral being confined with the gout, it was decided to persist in the same course, with the signal to engage to leeward.”  Rodney at that time was nearly sixty-two, and a constant martyr to gout in both feet and hands.

The two successes by the way imparted a slightly triumphal character to the welcome of the Admiral by the garrison, then sorely in need of some good news.  The arrival of much-needed supplies from home was itself a matter of rejoicing; but it was more inspiriting still to see following in the train of the friendly fleet five hostile ships of the line, one of them bearing the flag of a Commander-in-Chief, and to hear that, besides these, three more had been sunk or destroyed.  The exultation in England was even greater, and especially at the Admiralty, which was labouring under the just indignation of the people for the unpreparedness of the Navy.  “You have taken more line-of-battle ships,” wrote the First Lord to Rodney, “than had been captured in any one action in either of the two last preceding wars.”

It should be remembered, too, as an element in the triumph, that this advantage over an exposed detachment had been snatched, as it were, in the teeth of a main fleet superior to Rodney’s own; for twenty Spanish and four French ships of the line, under Admiral de Cordova, were lying then in Cadiz Bay.  During the eighteen days when the British remained in and near the Straits, no attempt was made by Cordova to take revenge for the disaster, or to reap the benefit of superior force.  The inaction was due, probably, to the poor condition of the Spanish ships in point of efficiency and equipment, and largely to their having uncoppered bottoms.  This element of inferiority in the Spanish navy should be kept in mind as a factor in the general war, although Spanish fleets did not come much into battle.  A French Commodore, then with the Spanish fleet in Ferrol, wrote as follows:  “Their ships all sail so badly that they can neither overtake an enemy nor escape from one.  The Glorieux is a bad sailer in the French navy, but better than the best among the Spaniards.”  He adds:  “The vessels of Langara’s squadron were surprised at immense distances one from the other.  Thus they always sail, and their negligence and security on this point are incredible.”