These projects all fell to pieces before a strong east wind, and a change of mind in the French government.  On the 16th of August, before Plymouth, d’Orvilliers was notified that not the Isle of Wight, but the coast of Cornwall, near Falmouth, was to be the scene of landing.  The effect of this was to deprive the huge fleet of any anchorage,—­a resource necessary even to steamers, and far more to sailing vessels aiming to remain in a position.  As a point to begin shore operations, too, as well as to sustain them, such a remote corner of the country to be invaded was absurd.  D’Orvilliers duly represented all this, but could not stay where he was long enough to get a reply.  An easterly gale came on, which blew hard for several days and drove the allies out of the Channel.  On the 25th of August word was received that the British fleet was near Scilly.  A council of war was then held, which decided that, in view of the terrible increase of disease in the shipping, and of the shortness of provisions, it was expedient not to reenter the Channel, but to seek the enemy, and bring him to battle.  This was done.  On the 29th Hardy was sighted, being then on his return up Channel.  With the disparity of force he could not but decline action, and the allies were unable to compel it.  On the 3d of September he reached Spithead.  D’Orvilliers soon afterwards received orders to return to Brest, and on the 14th the combined fleet anchored there.

The criticism to be passed on the conduct of this summer campaign by the British Ministry is twofold.  In the first place, it was not ready according to the reasonable standard of the day, which recognised in the probable cooperation of the two Bourbon kingdoms, France and Spain, the measure of the minimum naval force permissible to Great Britain.  Secondly, the entrance of Spain into the war had been foreseen months before.  For the inferior force, therefore, it was essential to prevent a junction,—­to take an interior position.  The Channel fleet ought to have been off Brest before the French sailed.  After they were gone, there was still fair ground for the contention of the Opposition, that they should have been followed, and attacked, off the coast of Spain.  During the six weeks they waited there, they were inferior to Hardy’s force.  Allowance here must be made, however, for the inability of a representative government to disregard popular outcry, and to uncover the main approach to its own ports.  This, indeed, does but magnify the error made in not watching Brest betimes; for in such case a fleet before Brest covered also the Channel.

With regard to the objects of the war in which they had become partners, the views of France and Spain accorded in but one point,—­the desirability of injuring Great Britain.  Each had its own special aim for its own advantage.  This necessarily introduced divergence of effort; but, France having first embarked alone in the contest and then sought the aid of Spain, the particular objects of her ally naturally obtained from the beginning a certain precedence.  Until near the close of the war, it may be said that the chief ambitions of France were in the West Indies; those of Spain, in Europe,—­to regain Minorca and Gibraltar.