The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 351 pages of information about The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence.

The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 351 pages of information about The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence.
be in line, the signal was made for the ships to engage, and form as they could get up."[60] It is clear from this not only that the ships were not in order, but also that they were to form under fire.  Three ships, the Sultan, 74, the Prince of Wales, 74, and the Boyne, 70, in the order named,—­the second carrying Barrington’s flag,—­were well ahead of the fleet (b).  The direction prescribed for the attack, that of the clustered ships in the French rear, carried the British down on a south-south-west, or south by west, course; and as the enemy’s van and centre were drawing out to the north-north-west, the two lines at that time resembled the legs of a “V,” the point of which was the anchorage off Georgetown.  Barrington’s three ships therefore neared the French order gradually, and had to receive its fire for some time before they could reply, unless, by hauling to the wind, they diverged from the set course.  This, and their isolation, made their loss very heavy.  When they reached the rear of the French, the latter’s column was tolerably formed, and Barrington’s ships wore (w) in succession,—­just as Harland’s had done in Keppel’s action,—­to follow on the other tack.  In doing this, the Sultan kept away under the stern of the enemy’s rearmost ship, to rake her; to avoid which the latter bore up.  The Sultan thus lost time and ground, and Barrington took the lead, standing along the French line, from rear to van, and to windward.

Meanwhile, the forming of the enemy had revealed to Byron for the first time, and to his dismay, that he had been deceived in thinking the French force inferior to his own.  “However, the general chase was continued, and the signal made for close engagement."[61] The remainder of the ships stood down on the port tack, as the first three had done, and wore in the wake of the latter, whom they followed; but before reaching the point of wearing, three ships, “the Grafton, 74, the Cornwall, 74, and the Lion, 64 (c), happening to be to leeward,[62] sustained the fire of the enemy’s whole line, as it passed on the starboard tack.”  It seems clear that, having had the wind, during the night and now, and being in search of an enemy, it should not have “happened” that any ships should have been so far to leeward as to be unsupported.  Captain Thomas White, R.N., writing as an advocate of Byron, says,[63] “while the van was wearing ... the sternmost ships were coming up under Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker....  Among these ships, the Cornwall and Lion, from being nearer the enemy than those about them (for the rear division had not then formed into line), drew upon themselves almost the whole of the enemy’s fire.”  No words can show more clearly the disastrous, precipitate disorder in which this attack was conducted.  The Grafton, White says, was similarly situated.  In consequence, these three were so crippled, besides a heavy loss in men, that they dropped far to leeward and astern (c’, c"), when on the other tack.

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The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.