Being bound for nearly the same point, the two hostile bodies steered parallel courses, each ignorant of the other’s nearness.  In the latitude of Bermuda both suffered from a violent gale, but the French most; the flagship Languedoc losing her main and mizzen topmasts.  On the 25th of November one[54] of Hotham’s convoy fell into the hands of d’Estaing, who then first learned of the British sailing.  Doubtful whether their destination was Barbados or Antigua,—­their two chief stations,—­he decided for the latter.  Arriving off it on the 6th of December, he cruised for forty-eight hours, and then bore away for Fort Royal, Martinique, the principal French depot in the West Indies, where he anchored on the 9th.  On the 10th Hotham joined Barrington at Barbados.

Barrington knew already what he wanted to do, and therefore lost not a moment in deliberation.  The troops were kept on board, Hotham’s convoy arrangements being left as they were.  On the morning of December 12th the entire force sailed again, the main changes in it being in the chief command, and in the addition of Barrington’s two ships of the line.  On the afternoon of the 13th the shipping anchored in the Grand Cul de Sac, an inlet on the west side of Santa Lucia, which is seventy miles east-north-east from Barbados.  Part of the troops landed at once, and seized the batteries and heights on the north side of the bay.  The remainder were put on shore the next morning.  The French forces were inadequate to defend their works; but it is to be observed that they were driven with unremitting energy, and that to this promptness the British owed their ability to hold the position.

[Illustration]

Three miles north of the Cul de Sac is a bay then called the Carenage; now Port Castries.  At its northern extremity is a precipitous promontory, La Vigie, then fortified, upon the tenure of which depended not only control of that anchorage, but also access to the rear of the works which commanded the Cul de Sac.  If those works fell, the British squadron must abandon its position and put to sea, where d’Estaing’s much superior fleet would be in waiting.  On the other hand, if the squadron were crushed at its anchors, the troops were isolated and must ultimately capitulate.  Therefore La Vigie and the squadron were the two keys to the situation, and the loss of either would be decisive.

By the evening of the 14th the British held the shore line from La Vigie to the southern point of the Cul de Sac, as well as Morne Fortune (Fort Charlotte), the capital of the island.  The feeble French garrison retired to the interior, leaving its guns unspiked, and its ammunition and stores untouched,—­another instance of the danger of works turning to one’s own disadvantage.  It was Barrington’s purpose now to remove the transports to the Carenage, as a more commodious harbour, probably also better defended; but he was prevented by the arrival of d’Estaing that afternoon.  “Just as all the important stations were secured, the French colours struck, and General Grant’s headquarters established at the Governor’s house, the Ariadne frigate came in sight with the signal abroad for the approach of an enemy."[55] The French fleet was seen soon afterwards from the heights above the squadron.