The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 351 pages of information about The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence.

The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 351 pages of information about The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence.
the ships were steering north-west; always in line of battle.  The French Admiral seems to have followed this movement cautiously, on an outer circle but with a higher speed, so that from east-north-east in the morning, which, as the fleets were then heading, would be on the starboard side of the British, abreast and to windward, at 4 P.M. the French bore south-south-east, which would be somewhat on the port quarter, or nearly astern but to leeward.  At this time their van was estimated by Howe to be two or three miles from the British rear, and, according to his reading of their manoeuvres, d’Estaing was forming his line for the same tack as the British, with a view of “engaging the British squadron to leeward,” whereby he would obtain over it the advantage of using the lower-deck guns, the wind and sea having become much heavier.  As the French Admiral, in this new disposition, had put his heaviest ships in the van, and his line was nearly in the wake of the British, Howe inferred an attack upon his rear.  He therefore ordered his heaviest ship, the Cornwall, 74, to go there from the centre, exchanging places with the Centurion, 50, and at the same time signalled the fleet to close to the centre,—­a detail worth remembering in view of Rodney’s frustrated manoeuvre of April 17th, 1780.  It now remained simply to await firmly the moment when the French should have covered the intervening ground, and brought to action so much of his rear as d’Estaing saw fit to engage; the conditions of the sea favoring the speed of the bulkier ships that composed the hostile fleet.  The latter, however, soon abandoned the attempt, and “bore away to the southward, apparently from the state of the weather, which, by the wind freshening much, with frequent rain, was now rendered very unfavorable for engaging.”  It may be added that the hour was very late for beginning an action.  At sundown the British were under close-reefed topsails, and the sea such that Howe was unable to return to the Eagle.[33]

The wind now increased to great violence, and a severe storm raged on the coast until the evening of the 13th, throwing the two fleets into confusion, scattering the ships, and causing numerous disasters.  The Apollo lost her foremast, and sprung the mainmast, on the night of the 12th.  The next day only two British ships of the line and three smaller vessels were in sight of their Admiral.  When the weather moderated, Howe went on board the Phoenix, 44, and thence to the Centurion, 50, with which he “proceeded to the southward, and on the 15th discovered ten sail of the French squadron, some at anchor in the sea, about twenty-five leagues east from Cape May."[34] Leaving there the Centurion, to direct to New York any of Byron’s ships that might come on the coast, he departed thither himself also, and on the evening of the 17th rejoined the squadron off Sandy Hook, the appointed rendezvous.  Many injuries had been received by the various ships, but they were mostly of a minor character; and on the 22d the fleet again put to sea in search of the enemy.

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The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.