of a “fleet in being;” but the instances also, when the conditions are analysed, will suggest the question:  Is such effect always legitimate, inherent in the existence of the fleet itself, or does it not depend often upon the characteristics of the man affected?  The contemporary British narrative of these events in Narragansett Bay, after reciting the various obstacles and the inferiority of the British squadron, says:  “The most skilful officers were therefore of opinion that the Vice-Admiral could not risk an attack; and it appears by his Lordship’s public letter that this was also his own opinion:  under such circumstances, he judged it was impracticable to afford the General any essential relief.”  In both these instances, the admirals concerned were impelled to sacrifice the almost certain capture, not of a mere position, but of a decisive part of the enemy’s organised forces, by the mere possibility of action; by the moral effect produced by a fleet greatly inferior to their own, which in neither case would have attacked, as things stood.  What does this prove?

Immediately upon Howe’s appearance, the French seamen who had landed the day before on Conanicut were recalled to their ships.  The next morning, August 10, at 7 A.M., the wind came out strong at north-east, which is exceptional at that season.  D’Estaing at once put to sea, cutting the cables in his haste.  In two hours he was outside, steering for the enemy.  Howe, of course, retired at once; his inferiority[32] did not permit an engagement except on his own terms.  To insure these, he needed the weather-gage, the offensive position of that day, which by keeping south he expected to gain, when the usual wind from that quarter should set in.  The French Admiral had the same object, hoping to crush his agile opponent; and, as the sea breeze from south-west did not make that day, he succeeded in keeping the advantage with which he had started, despite Howe’s skill.  At nightfall both fleets were still steering to the southward, on the port tack, the French five or six miles in the rear of the British, with the wind variable at east.  The same course was maintained throughout the night, the French gradually overhauling the British, and becoming visible at 3 A.M. of the 11th.  By Howe’s dispatch, they bore in the morning, at an hour not specified, east-north-east, which would be nearly abeam, but somewhat more distant than the night before, having apparently kept closer to the wind, which by this had steadied at east-north-east.

In the course of the day Howe shifted his flag from the Eagle, 64, to the Apollo, 32, and placed himself between the two fleets, the better to decide the movements of his own.  Finding it impossible to gain the weather-gage, and unwilling, probably, to be drawn too far from Rhode Island, he now made a wide circle with the fleet by a succession of changes of course:  at 8 A.M. to south, then to south-west and west, until finally, at 1.30 P.M.,