The British ministry was not insensible of the danger, the imminence of which had been felt during the previous year; but it had not got ready betimes, owing possibly to confident expectations of success from the campaign of 1777.  The ships, in point of numbers and equipment, were not as far forward as the Admiralty had represented; and difficulty, amounting for the moment to impossibility, was experienced in manning them.  The vessels of the Channel fleet had to be robbed of both crews and stores to compose a proper reinforcement for America.  Moreover, the destination of the Toulon squadron was unknown, the French government having given out that it was bound to Brest, where over twenty other ships of the line were in an advanced state of preparation.  Not until the 5th of June, when d’Estaing was already eight weeks out, was certain news brought by a frigate, which had watched his fleet after it had passed Gibraltar, and which had accompanied it into the Atlantic ninety leagues west of the Straits.  The reinforcement for America was then permitted to depart.  On the 9th of June, thirteen ships of the line sailed for New York under the command of Vice-Admiral John Byron.[20]

These delays occasioned a singular and striking illustration of the ill effects upon commerce of inadequate preparation for manning the fleet.  A considerable number of West India ships, with stores absolutely necessary for the preservation of the islands, waited at Portsmouth for convoy for upwards of three months, while the whole fleet, of eighty sail, was detained for five weeks after it had assembled; “and, although the wind came fair on the 19th of May, it did not sail till the 26th, owing to the convoying ships, the Boyne and the Ruby, not being ready.”  Forty-five owners and masters signed a letter to the Admiralty, stating these facts.  “The convoy,” they said, “was appointed to sail April 10th.”  Many ships had been ready as early as February.  “Is not this shameful usage, my Lords, thus to deceive the public in general?  There are two hundred ships loaded with provisions, etc., waiting at Spithead these three months.  The average expense of each ship amounts to L150 monthly, so that the expense of the whole West India fleet since February amounts to L90,000.”

The West Indies before the war had depended chiefly upon their fellow colonies on the American continent for provisions, as well as for other prime necessaries.  Not only were these cut off as an incident of the war, entailing great embarrassment and suffering, which elicited vehement appeals from the planter community to the home government, but the American privateers preyed heavily upon the commerce of the islands, whose industries were thus smitten root and branch, import and export.  In 1776, salt food for whites and negroes had risen from 50 to 100 per cent, and corn, the chief support of the slaves,—­the laboring class,—­by 400 per cent.  At the same time sugar had fallen from 25 to 40 per cent in price,