The little American navy on Champlain was wiped out; but never had any force, big or small, lived to better purpose or died more gloriously, for it had saved the Lake for that year.  Whatever deductions may be made for blunders, and for circumstances of every character which made the British campaign of 1777 abortive and disastrous, thus leading directly to the American alliance with France in 1778, the delay, with all that it involved, was obtained by the Lake campaign of 1776.  On October 15th, two days after Arnold’s final defeat, Carleton dated a letter to Douglas from before Crown Point, whence the American garrison was withdrawn.  A week later Riedesel arrived, and wrote that, “were our whole army here it would be an easy matter to drive the enemy from their entrenchments,” at Ticonderoga, and—­as has been quoted already—­four weeks sooner would have insured its fall.  It is but a coincidence that just four weeks had been required to set up the Inflexible at St. John’s; but it typifies the whole story.  Save for Arnold’s flotilla, the two British schooners would have settled the business.  “Upon the whole, Sir,” wrote Douglas in his final letter from Quebec before sailing for England, “I scruple not to say, that had not General Carleton authorized me to take the extraordinary measure of sending up the Inflexible from Quebec, things could not this year have been brought to so glorious a conclusion on Lake Champlain.”  Douglas further showed the importance attached to this success by men of that day, by sending a special message to the British ambassador at Madrid, “presuming that the early knowledge of this great event in the southern parts of Europe may be of advantage to His Majesty’s service.”  That the opinion of the government was similar may be inferred from the numerous rewards bestowed.  Carleton was made a Knight of the Bath, and Douglas a baronet.

The gallantry shown by both sides upon Lake Champlain in 1776 is evident from the foregoing narrative.  With regard to the direction of movements,—­the skill of the two leaders,—­the same equal credit cannot be assigned.  It was a very serious blunder, on October 11th, to run to leeward, passing a concealed enemy, undetected, upon waters so perfectly well known as those of Champlain were; it having been the scene of frequent British operations in previous wars.  Owing to this, “the Maria, because of her distant situation (from which the Inflexible and Carleton had chased by signal) when the rebels were first discovered, and baffling winds, could not get into close action."[13] For the same reason the Inflexible could not support the Carleton.  The Americans, in the aggregate distinctly inferior, were thus permitted a concentration of superior force upon part of their enemies.  It is needless to enlarge upon the mortifying incident of Arnold’s escape that evening.  To liken small things to great,—­always profitable in military analysis,—­it resembled Hood’s slipping away from de Grasse at St. Kitts.[14]